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INTRODUCTION 
On May 31, 2010, in the early hours of the morning, Israeli 
Defense Forces boarded and occupied a flotilla of six vessels 
seventy-two nautical miles from the coast of Gaza. The flotilla 
carried food and other supplies to Gaza, which was under a na-
val blockade. During the incident, nine passengers were killed 
and several others wounded. In the aftermath, a key question 
that emerged was what body of law applied to the incident? 
Was it subject to human rights law, international humanitari-
an law, or some mix of the two?1 
 
†  Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, 
Yale Law School; law clerk, Judge Mark Kravitz (D.Conn.); J.D. 2012, Yale 
Law School; J.D. 2012, Yale Law School; Associate, Arnold & Porter; Re-
searcher at InterRights (London); and MPP candidate, Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton University & J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, respectively. 
Sara Solow, Aileen Nowlan, Saurabh Sanghvi, and Elizabeth Nielsen provided 
important assistance in preparing this Article. The authors also thank Tom 
Dannenbaum for his very helpful contributions. Copyright © 2012 by Oona A. 
Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, Chel-
sea Purvis, and Julia Spiegel. 
 1. SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON THE 31 MAY 2010 FLO-
TILLA INCIDENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF INQUIRY ON 
THE 31 MAY 2010 FLOTILLA INCIDENT, at 97 (July 2011), http://www.un.org/ 
News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf (noting, in dis-
cussing the issue, that “[t]here has been considerable legal debate on the pre-
cise nature of the relationship between these two legal regimes,” and that 
“[p]ositions taken in academic writing range from complete separation to com-
plementarity and even fusion”). Hereinafter, this Article uses the term “hu-
manitarian law” to refer to what is often termed “international humanitarian 
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This same question has been at the heart of ongoing de-
bates over the counter-terrorism operations of the United 
States in the wake of September 11, 2001. There was relatively 
little discussion of the relationship between human rights law 
and humanitarian law in the U.S. government before the ter-
rorist attacks on September 11, 2001, because the issue did not 
often arise. On those few occasions that it did arise, the gov-
ernment’s position was far from consistent. In 1970, the U.S. 
government supported U.N. General Assembly resolutions call-
ing for compliance with human rights obligations during armed 
conflicts.2 In 1984, however, the United States made clear its 
view that the Convention Against Torture—a core human 
rights treaty—was inapplicable during armed conflict.3 The 
United States appeared to switch positions yet again when it 
adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 1992 without adding a similar disclaimer.4  
 
law” or “the law of armed conflict”—the law that regulates the conduct of 
armed conflicts found in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and related protocols, 
treaties, case law, and customary international law. 
 2. In 1970, the General Assembly adopted five resolutions on the subject 
of human rights in armed conflict, including one co-sponsored by the United 
States on the humane treatment of prisoners of war, urging “strict compliance 
with the provisions of existing international instruments concerning human 
rights in armed conflicts.” G.A. Res. 2676 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2676, at 77 (Dec. 9, 1970); see also Airgram from the Department 
of State to Certain Posts (Aug. 12, 1971), in 5 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1969–1972, at 177, 187 (Evan M. Duncan, ed., 2004). Another 
unanimous resolution (not including eight abstentions) issued the same day 
stated: “Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid 
down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of 
armed conflict.” G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2675, at 76 (Dec. 9, 1970) (voting record available at http://www.un.org/ 
en/ga/documents/voting.asp). 
 3. Rep. of the Working Grp. on a Draft Convention Against Torture & 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, 40th Sess., ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9, 1984) (ar-
guing that “the convention . . . was never intended to apply to armed conflicts 
and thus supersede the 1949 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law in 
armed conflicts and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto”).  
 4. The decision was all the more striking because the Human Rights 
Committee had made clear its view that the Convention was applicable during 
armed conflict. See Françoise J. Hampson, The Relationship Between Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a 
Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 550 n.5 (2008). It is 
of course possible that the United States regarded a reservation as unneces-
sary because it did not believe the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights would apply extraterritorially. But it is also possible to interpret the 
decision to suggest U.S. acceptance of the idea that some human rights norms 
applied during times of armed conflict. 
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After the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, the question became much more pressing. The ongoing 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and extensive detainee opera-
tions, have turned questions that were once a hypothetical pos-
sibility into real legal dilemmas.5 In 2010, U.S. Department of 
State Legal Adviser Harold Koh appeared before the American 
Society of International Law to reaffirm that all relevant laws 
of war apply even to detainees earlier deemed “enemy combat-
ant[s].”6 He emphasized that, “as a matter of international law, 
this Administration has expressly acknowledged that interna-
tional law informs the scope of our detention authority.”7 He al-
so argued that targeting decisions comply with “all applicable 
law, including the laws of war.”8 Yet Koh left unaddressed a 
 
 5. State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger faced these issues in 
his appearance before the Committee Against Torture in 2006. John B. 
Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Remarks at U.S. 
Meeting with U.N. Committee Against Torture (May 5, 2006), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68557.htm; see Memorandum from the Govern-
ment of the United States of America (Mar. 10, 2006) available at http:// 
www.asil.org/pdfs/ilib0603212.pdf (reply to the Report of the Five UNCHR 
Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay); see also Memorandum 
from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the U.N. Committee Against Torture (Apr. 28, 
2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/68662.pdf 
(response to questions asked by the committee against torture). Bellinger ex-
plained that “[i]t is the view of the United States that these detention opera-
tions are governed by the law of armed conflict, which is the lex specialis ap-
plicable to those operations.” Bellinger, supra. The current legal adviser has 
also addressed these issues. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Int’l Law 
(Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
139119.htm (“[W]e continue to fight a war of self-defense against an enemy 
that attacked us on September 11, 2001, and before, and that continues to un-
dertake armed attacks against the United States.”). 
 6. Koh, supra note 5 (“Let there be no doubt: the Obama Administration 
is firmly committed to complying with all applicable law, including the laws of 
war, in all aspects of these ongoing armed conflicts . . . . We in the Obama 
Administration have worked hard since we entered office to ensure that we 
conduct all aspects of these armed conflicts—in particular, detention opera-
tions, targeting, and prosecution of terrorist suspects—in a manner consistent 
not just with the applicable laws of war, but also with the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.”); see also Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding 
the Gov’t’s Detention Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 
1, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(No. 08-442) (“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily 
informed by principles of the laws of war.”). 
 7. Koh, supra note 5. 
 8. Id.; see also Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s 
Detention Auth. Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, supra note 6 
(“The detention authority conferred by the AUMF is necessarily informed by 
principles of the laws of war.”). 
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key legal question: Which law governs during armed conflict—
human rights law or humanitarian law?  
This Article aims to answer that question. It considers the 
relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law 
in the context of armed conflict and occupation. It draws on ju-
risprudence, state practice, and recent scholarship to describe 
three central approaches to applying the two bodies of law, to 
offer a recommendation as to which of the approaches provides 
the best guide to reconciling conflicts between the two bodies of 
law, and to explain the stakes of that choice.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I addresses a 
threshold question: under what conditions does each body of 
law potentially apply? This Part outlines methods for determin-
ing when an armed conflict or occupation situation exists, since 
armed conflict and occupation activate humanitarian law.9 It 
then examines territorial sovereignty and the emerging effective-
control standard for the extraterritorial application of human 
rights as prerequisites for the application of human rights law.  
Part II identifies three theoretical approaches to the rela-
tionship between the two bodies of law. First is the Displace-
ment Model. The Displacement Model has the virtue of simplic-
ity: During an armed conflict, humanitarian law displaces 
human rights law. When no armed conflict exists, human 
rights law displaces humanitarian law. Second is the Comple-
mentarity Model. Complementarity is relatively simple in theo-
ry, though substantially more complicated in practice. In the 
Complementarity Model, as in all the models, when there is no 
armed conflict, only human rights law applies. When there is 
an armed conflict, however, human rights law and humanitari-
an law are applied and interpreted harmoniously. The two bod-
ies of law thus have what this Article terms a “relationship of 
interpretation.” Third is the Conflict Resolution Model. In the 
Conflict Resolution Model, when an armed conflict is present, 
the decision maker must evaluate the relationship between 
human rights law and humanitarian law. If they are, in fact, 
complementary, then both are applied. If they conflict, howev-
er, the model offers three possible decision rules—event-specific 
displacement, reverse event-specific displacement, and specific-
ity—for deciding the appropriate body of law to be applied.  
 
 9. For the sake of simplicity, most of this Article refers only to “armed 
conflict,” though the legal analysis applies to both armed conflict and occupation. 
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Part II concludes with a detailed discussion of the specifici-
ty-decision rule variation of the Conflict Resolution Model. Un-
der this decision rule, in situations of conflict between relevant 
human rights law and humanitarian law, the law more specific 
to the particular situation should govern. This Part also de-
scribes a number of factors that aid in determining which body 
of law is more specific to a given situation. The specificity rule 
of conflict resolution that we detail derives from the broader lex 
specialis maxim, which states that “whenever two or more 
norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be 
given to the norm that is more specific.”10 However, the speci-
ficity rule applies at the level of the operation, situation, or en-
counter, so that whichever body of law is eclipsed in that opera-
tion, situation, or encounter still remains relevant in the 
broader armed conflict.  
Part III argues for the specificity rule variation of the Con-
flict Resolution Model—and shows how that rule would oper-
ate. This rule offers a legally and morally defensible approach 
to the question of which law governs during armed conflict. It 
recognizes that both bodies of law can productively inform each 
other when they do not squarely conflict, yet allows for highly 
nuanced determinations as to when conduct is governed best by 
each body of law when conflict is unavoidable. Above all, the 
approach recognizes that total abrogation of human rights law 
in a zone of armed conflict is too blunt an instrument to accom-
plish the most basic goal common to both human rights law and 
humanitarian law: to effectively protect fundamental human 
dignity.  
Part IV applies the theoretical discussion of Parts II and 
III to examples of conduct governed by both bodies of law. It 
examines situations in which conflicts actually exist between 
the two and considers how they might be approached. Square 
conflicts between the two bodies of law can be found in situa-
tions of armed conflict when human rights law regarding the 
right to life; detention and the right to trial; women’s rights; 
and the rights to freedom of expression, association, and 
movement is implicated. To take just the right to life, humani-
tarian law permits state agents to intentionally kill combatants 
and incidentally kill civilians (within clearly proscribed limits) 
in circumstances that human rights law does not countenance. 
At bottom, therefore, human rights law and humanitarian law 
 
 10. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug. 
11, 2006, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). 
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give fundamentally different answers to the question of when 
state agents can use lethal force. The same is true of each of 
these conflicts between the two bodies of law, thus making 
plain the high stakes of the answer to the question of which law 
governs—and the pressing need to address it.  
Finally, this Article concludes with a call to a renewed and 
robust debate over which law governs during armed conflict. 
This issue is more pressing today than ever before. Human 
rights jurisprudence is placing greater obligations on states act-
ing outside their own territory, and modern warfare is rarely 
limited to the traditional “battlefield.” Conflict between human-
itarian law and human rights law is therefore inevitable, and 
finding a way to resolve this conflict is essential to the contin-
ued vitality of both bodies of law.  
I.  WHEN DOES EACH BODY OF LAW APPLY?   
Before we examine the relationship between human rights 
law and humanitarian law, we first must ask when each body 
of law applies to a given situation. After all, choosing between 
the two bodies of law requires that either body of law could po-
tentially apply. Yet each body of law has rules governing 
whether it is applicable to a given situation—rules that are 
completely independent of any conflict between them. This Part 
offers an overview of when each body of law applies. This pro-
vides the necessary background for the next Part, which con-
siders the options for resolving conflicts that arise between the 
two bodies of law when both might apply to a given situation. 
A. WHEN DOES INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLY?  
Humanitarian law applies only in situations of armed con-
flict; hence the applicability of this body of law turns on wheth-
er an armed conflict or occupation exists. The fundamental 
question of when an armed conflict or occupation exists may 
appear on its face quite simple and obvious, but in reality is ex-
traordinarily complex. Here we sketch the key legal principles 
that are generally used to answer this question.  
We begin briefly with how to identify the existence of an 
“occupation.” Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Convention pro-
vides: “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation 
extends only to the territory where such authority has been es-
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tablished and can be exercised.”11 Article 43 similarly speaks of 
the “authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed in-
to the hands of the occupant . . . .”12 In addition, Common Arti-
cle 2 of the Geneva Conventions provides that the Conventions 
“shall apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the ter-
ritory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation 
meets with no armed resistance.”13 It is clear that an occupa-
tion ends when the occupying power withdraws its forces from 
the territory in question. There is some controversy over 
whether an occupation ends when the government of the terri-
tory formally consents to the continued presence of foreign 
troops or whether some level of effective authority must be 
transferred as well.14  
Identifying the existence of an armed conflict is markedly 
more challenging—and has become more so in recent years 
with the decreasing frequency of traditional “battlefield” con-
flicts and the proliferation of non-state armed actors with a 
cross-national presence, like al-Qaeda. Among the most com-
prehensive recent efforts to define armed conflict is the Inter-
national Law Association’s Final Report on the Meaning of 
Armed Conflict in International Law.15 After the initiation of 
the “war on terror,” the Executive Committee of the Interna-
tional Law Association “was asked to . . . report on how inter-
national law defines and distinguishes situations of armed con-
flict and those situations in which peacetime law prevails.”16 
The Committee found that, today: 
Declarations of war or armed conflict, national legislation, expres-
sions of subjective intent by parties to a conflict, and the like, may 
have evidentiary value but such expressions do not alone create a de 
jure state of war or armed conflict . . . . The de jure state or situation 
 
 11. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 
42, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. 
 12. Id. art. 43. 
 13. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]. 
 14. See Siobhán Wills, The Obligations Due to Former “Protected Persons” 
in Conflicts that Have Ceased to Be International, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY 
L. 117, 131–33 (2010) (describing contemporary debates over the meaning of 
occupation under international law). 
 15. INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CON-
FLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/ 
committees/index.cfm/cid/1022.  
 16. Id. at 1. 
 1890 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1883 
 
of armed conflict depends on the presence of actual and observable 
facts, in other words, objective criteria.17  
While “the Committee found no widely accepted definition 
of armed conflict in any treaty, . . . [i]t did . . . discover signifi-
cant evidence in the sources of international law that the inter-
national community embraces a common understanding of 
armed conflict.”18 The two characteristics the Committee identi-
fied as common to all armed conflict were, first, “[t]he existence 
of organized armed groups” and, second, that the groups are 
“[e]ngaged in fighting of some intensity.”19  
The Committee report drew on, among a diverse array of 
other sources, the frequently cited 1995 decision of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Prosecu-
tor v. Tadić, which also pointed to two factors—organization of 
armed groups and intensity of fighting—as the defining charac-
teristics of armed conflict.20 Of course, what constitutes a suffi-
ciently organized armed group and what counts as sufficient in-
tensity of fighting are issues not fully settled by this case or 
any other single source. 
Even when it is clear that an armed conflict exists, there is 
often a further question of whether the conflict is an interna-
tional armed conflict (IAC) or a noninternational armed conflict 
(NIAC). Identifying the type of armed conflict is an important 
step in selecting the international humanitarian instruments 
 
 17. Id. at 33. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions similarly pro-
vides that “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or 
of any other armed conflict which may arise . . . .” GC III, supra note 13, art. 2. 
 18. INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 15, at 1. 
 19. Id. at 2. It should be noted that the ICRC commentary on Common 
Article 2 can be read to adopt a lower threshold for the existence of an armed 
conflict: 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the inter-
vention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 2 . . . . It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how 
much slaughter takes place. The respect due to human personality is 
not measured by the number of victims. Nor, incidentally, does the 
application of the Convention necessarily involve the intervention of 
cumbrous machinery. It all depends on circumstances. If there is only 
a single wounded person as a result of the conflict, the Convention will 
have been applied as soon as he has been collected and tended . . . . 
1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952). The ICRC commentaries on the 
other Geneva Conventions contain similar language. 
 20. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/ 
Prosecutorv. Tadić.pdf. 
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and customary rules that apply.21 Recently, particularly in the 
“war on terror” context, the line between international and non-
international armed conflict has blurred, and there have been 
calls for a new common definition of armed conflict.22 Until that 
happens, the factors outlined by the International Law Associa-
tion and in the Tadić case will continue to provide the best 
available guidance on the question of when an armed conflict 
exists and therefore when humanitarian law applies. 
B. WHEN DOES HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY?  
Compared to humanitarian law, human rights law is more 
varied and stems from more diverse legal sources. There are 
over one hundred different human rights treaties as well as 
multiple customary international human rights norms that 
govern state action.23 Human rights law addresses a wide 
range of behavior and actions, including torture, genocide, 
women’s rights, children’s rights, racial discrimination, and the 
right to life, to name just a few.24  
The immense variation in human rights law makes it diffi-
cult to provide a blanket characterization of its applicability. 
For those areas of human rights law where there is a treaty 
that is the key source of the legal rules governing state conduct, 
the application of those rules is generally guided by that treaty 
and authoritative interpretations of it. In these cases, the ap-
plication of human rights law may be expressly limited by the 
treaty itself—for example, it may be explicitly limited to the 
geographic territory of the ratifying States or to particular 
types of perpetrators. For those areas of human rights that de-
rive from more diffuse sources or that have attained customary 
 
 21. Compare Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flict, arts. 51(3), 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I], with 
Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 
6(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. See generally ICRC, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3–24 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Dorwald-Beck eds., 2005) (explaining the different rules 
of customary international humanitarian law in international and 
noninternational armed conflicts). 
 22. See James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict 
in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed 
Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313, 344–49 (2003). 
 23. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Differ-
ence?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937–41 (2002). 
 24. See id. at 1963–75. 
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international law or jus cogens status, on the other hand, the 
law may have comprehensive application. 
There are, nonetheless, a few observations about the ap-
plicability of human rights law that are possible as a general 
matter. Human rights law almost always applies at a minimum 
within the territorial boundaries of the States that have rati-
fied the relevant human rights treaties. This obligation has 
long been widely accepted.25  
As States have increasingly found themselves operating 
outside their own territorial boundaries—including in the con-
text of armed conflict and the “war on terror”—the question has 
more frequently arisen whether human rights obligations apply 
extraterritorially, particularly with respect to non-citizens. In 
the past, representatives of the United States have taken the 
position that such obligations—including those under the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
Convention Against Torture—do not apply extraterritorially.26  
 
 25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (obligating members “to en-
sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant”); Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), availa-
ble at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf 
(“[E]very individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive . . . to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms . . . both among the peoples of Member 
States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their  
jurisdiction.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Bellinger, supra note 5 (“As a general matter, countries nego-
tiating the Convention [Against Torture] were principally focused on dealing 
with rights to be afforded to people through the operation of ordinary domestic 
legal processes . . . . ”); Letter from Kevin Moley, Permanent Representative of 
the U.S. to the U.N. & Other Int’l Orgs. in Geneva, to the Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights (Jan. 31, 2006), reprinted as U.N. High Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Rep. of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention et al. on the Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 
Annex II, E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006) (“The United States has made clear 
its position that . . . the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
by its express terms, applies only to ‘individuals within its territory and sub-
ject to its jurisdiction’ [and not, e.g., to detainees outside the territorial 
U.S.].”), available at http://www.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/research/ 
rth/docs/GBAY.pdf. The United States’s fourth periodic report required under 
the ICCPR did not reject or accept the extraterritorial application of the Con-
vention; it was, instead, silent on the matter. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE U.S. TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
j/drl/rls/179781.htm. In light of the Committee’s position that the Convention 
does have extraterritorial effect, this silence might be seen as a move toward 
acceptance of extraterritorial effect. Nonetheless, it is premature to know with 
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Today there is growing consensus among international 
bodies and foreign States that human rights law obligations 
apply abroad wherever a State exercises “effective control” over 
territory or individuals outside its borders.27 This standard has 
been articulated slightly differently by different bodies, includ-
ing the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee, the Committee Against Tor-
ture, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights, as well as various national courts.28 
Although the specific legal formulations are different, the basic 
message is similar across all of these regimes: control, rather 
than territorial sovereignty, defines the outer limits of human 
rights law obligations.29 That principle, which is gaining grow-
ing acceptance in the international arena, may suggest much 
broader applicability for at least some human rights law than 
has been traditionally assumed—particularly in the United 
States. That, in turn, will give rise to increasing conflict be-
tween humanitarian law and human rights law during armed 
conflict. We turn next to exploring three different models for 
resolving this conflict between the two bodies of law. 
II.  THREE MODELS FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT   
There have been many efforts to make sense of the rela-
tionship between humanitarian law and human rights law. 
Here we categorize these efforts into three distinct models for 
 
certainty if this apparent softening on the part of the United States will have 
any legal consequences. 
 27. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Consti-
tution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 229 (2010) (“Regional human rights 
tribunals, the U.N. treaty bodies, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
all have recognized that human rights obligations travel with a state when a 
state or its agents place persons or territories under the state’s ‘effective con-
trol.’”); Oona A. Hathaway, et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human 
Rights Treaty Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389, 395–
420 (2010) (examining international and foreign case law regarding the exten-
sion of human rights obligations outside a state’s borders).  
 28. See Cleveland, supra note 27, at 248–70; Hathaway et al., supra note 
27, at 404–20. 
 29. See Cleveland, supra note 27, at 269 (“Whether one employs the ‘au-
thority and control’ test of the Inter-American system, the ‘power of effective 
control’ standard of the Human Rights Committee and the International Court 
of Justice, the ‘de facto and de jure effective control’ of the Committee Against 
Torture—all of which apply to control over either persons or territories . . . or 
the more territorially-constrained conception of ‘control’ of the ECHR, control, 
rather than geography, is the touchstone for the recognition of rights protec-
tions abroad.”) (emphasis in original)). 
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resolving conflicts between the two bodies of law in situations 
of armed conflict: the Displacement Model, the Complementari-
ty Model, and the Conflict Resolution Model. The models dis-
cussed herein are not formal rules of decision that different 
courts and governments have expressly adopted. Rather, they 
represent an attempt to classify the diverse approaches that 
tribunals, States, practitioners, and scholars have used or ad-
vocated into three analytically distinct categories. This effort to 
classify existing approaches must be tempered by a recognition 
that cases in the real world do not always fit neatly within a 
single model. For that reason, this discussion also notes cases 
that include language that might be read to support more than 
one model or that might be read differently in light of the dif-
ferent models.  
A. THE DISPLACEMENT MODEL 
The Displacement Model provides that whenever there is 
an armed conflict, humanitarian law displaces human rights 
law. Defining the zone of armed conflict is thus the first and 
last step for determining the appropriate body of law in the 
Displacement Model. If the conduct occurs within the zone of 
armed conflict, humanitarian law governs exclusively and dis-
places any human rights law that might otherwise apply. If the 
conduct is outside that zone, human rights law remains opera-
tive. Displacement models may vary in their definition of 
armed conflict, making the field for application of humanitari-
an law larger or smaller, but the basic tradeoff remains the 
same. Figure 1 illustrates the decision-making process under 
the Displacement Model. 
 
Figure 1 
Displacement Model 
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This approach is labeled “displacement” because humani-
tarian law is understood to displace human rights law entirely 
during armed conflict.30 The premise underlying this approach 
is that countries developed humanitarian law to replace the 
norms controlling peacetime behavior, due to the demands of 
military necessity and the limitations of control during armed 
conflict.31 In this model, lex specialis is determined at the level 
of the armed conflict—humanitarian law is the lex specialis for 
all conduct within the entire zone of an armed conflict. In this 
respect it differs markedly from the “event-specific displace-
ment” rule of decision (discussed in Part III.C.1 below), which 
similarly operates to displace human rights law, but on the 
much smaller scale of a single event, operation, or situation. 
Proponents of the displacement approach rely on an ag-
gressive reading of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opin-
ion.32 The ICJ wrote: 
In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one’s life [codi-
fied in Article 6 of the ICCPR] applies also in hostilities. The test of 
what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be de-
termined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain 
weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life 
contrary to Article 6 of the [ICCPR], can only be decided by reference 
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the 
terms of the [ICCPR] itself.33 
The Displacement Model emphasizes the qualifying “in princi-
ple” of the first sentence of this quote and the definitive “only” 
of the final sentence.34 In other words, it concludes that during 
hostilities, the only law relevant to determining whether a par-
 
 30. Memorandum from Tom Dannenbaum, The Interaction of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law with Respect 
to Rights to Life and Liberty, as part of the Allard K. Lowenstein Internation-
al Human Rights Clinic 7 (Dec. 17, 2009) (on file with authors) [hereinafter 
Dannenbaum Memo]. 
 31. Id. at 11; see Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of 
Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 347 (2007). But see David Kretzmer, Re-
thinking Application of IHL in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 42 ISR. L. 
REV. 1, 23–31 (2009) (arguing that, with the advent of the modern human 
rights regime, humanitarian law is anachronistic and unnecessary except in 
situations of extreme violence). 
 32. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 5–6. 
 33. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
95/7495.pdf. 
 34. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 12. 
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ticular loss of life constitutes an “arbitrary deprivation of life” 
is the law of armed conflict.35 
The United States government has at times articulated ar-
guments that could be read to reflect the Displacement Model, 
downplaying the role of human rights law in armed conflict—
particularly in the “global war on terror” context.36 The Israeli 
Government has also at times advocated the displacement ap-
proach, specifically by denying the applicability of human 
rights law to the Occupied Territories:  
Israel denies that the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, both of which it has signed, are applicable to the occu-
pied Palestinian territory. It asserts that humanitarian law is the 
protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended 
for the protection of citizens from their own Government in times of 
peace.37 
It takes this position not only because it rejects the extraterri-
torial application of human rights law,38 but also because it 
characterizes the situation in the Occupied Territories as one of 
ongoing armed conflict.39  
Aside from the U.S. and Israeli governments, there are few 
express adherents to the Displacement Model in the interna-
 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Bellinger, supra note 5 (“It is the view of the United States 
that . . . detention operations [in Guantánamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq] are 
governed by the law of armed conflict, which is the lex specialis applicable to 
those operations.”); Memorandum from the Government of the United States 
of America, supra note 5.; Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of State to the 
U.N. Committee Against Torture, supra note 5; see also Nancie Prud’homme, 
Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relation-
ship?, 40 ISR. L. REV. 356, 358 (2007). 
 37. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 102 (July 9). 
 38. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Second Periodic Rep. of Israel to the 
Human Rights Comm., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (Dec. 4, 2001) [here-
inafter Second Periodic Report], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc 
.nsf/%28Symbol%29/2cc0a33c394919e0c1256be9002e1188?Opendocument; see 
also Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 501, 519 (2008) (describing Israel as having 
“consistently objected to the extraterritorial application of human rights in-
struments”). But see HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in the West 
Bank 57 (2) PD 349 [2002] (Isr.). For a discussion of the extraterritorial appli-
cation of human rights law, see supra Part II.B. 
 39. See Prud’homme, supra note 36, at 376 (stating that Israel has “re-
ject[ed] the application of a number of human rights treaties in the Occupied 
Territories on the basis that this situation was one pertaining to armed  
conflict”). 
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tional community. The bluntness of the approach, which denies 
any role for human rights law during the course of an armed 
conflict, has been regarded by most as inconsistent with a seri-
ous commitment to human rights law.40 The bluntness of the 
model also prevents conflicts from being heard by legal bodies 
with the greatest subject-matter expertise. If human rights law 
is completely displaced and therefore inapplicable in the course 
of armed conflict, then the human rights bodies that are 
charged with overseeing States’ implementation of their human 
rights obligations have no obligations to oversee. If a child is a 
victim of violence during an armed conflict, for example, the 
Displacement Model or event-specific displacement might pre-
vent the international organization with the greatest expertise 
in children’s rights—the Committee for the Rights of the 
Child—from considering the violation. For if the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child is completely displaced by humanitarian 
law during armed conflict, there are no longer any treaty-based 
“obligations” for the Committee to oversee. 
The Displacement Model does, however, have the virtue of 
simplicity. The other two models allow both bodies of law to 
apply within the zone of armed conflict at various points. But 
this raises the difficult question of when each body of law 
should be applied to a given situation and how to resolve con-
flict between the two. The other two models—Complementarity 
and Conflict Resolution—offer two different answers to this 
question.  
B. THE COMPLEMENTARITY MODEL 
 The Complementarity Model provides that both bodies of 
law are applied and interpreted in concert with one another. 
Sometimes called the “mutual elaboration” or “coordinated in-
terpretation” approach,41 the model is grounded in the principle 
that the two bodies of law are engaged in a common mission to 
protect human life and dignity.42 It avoids the key weakness of 
the displacement approach, because it provides that human 
rights law can continue to offer guidance even when armed con-
 
 40. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 15, at 3.  
 41. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8. 
 42. See Jakob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), Address at the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law (Sept. 6, 2003), available at http://www.icrc 
.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5rfgaz (“The common underlying purpose of in-
ternational humanitarian law and international human rights law is the pro-
tection of the life, health and dignity of human beings.”). 
 1898 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1883 
 
flict is triggered. Because it assumes the two bodies of law 
share a common foundational mission, it views them not as ly-
ing in conflict but instead as complementary. The approach is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
Complementarity Model 
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conjunction with human rights law. If not, then only human 
rights law applies. 
The Complementarity Model relies on the authority of Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT), which requires treaty parties interpreting their obliga-
tions to take into account “[a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”43 As such, 
humanitarian law provides rules relevant to the interpretation 
of human rights law in times of armed conflict, while human 
rights law can do the same for humanitarian law.44  
The Complementarity Model suggests a different reading 
of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion than that of-
fered by advocates of the Displacement Model described in Part 
II.A.45 In language that immediately precedes that quoted 
above, the ICJ expressly states that the ICCPR applies in  
hostilities:  
[T]he protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 
of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in 
a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, how-
ever, such a provision.46 
Advocates of the Complementarity Model hold the lan-
guage to which the Displacement Model points, then, is better 
read not as calling for displacing human rights law in favor of 
humanitarian law but as using humanitarian law to inform the 
interpretation of human rights law—in this case, the meaning 
of an “arbitrary deprivation of life.”47  
The ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion supports this reading of 
the Nuclear Weapons opinion. The court explains that in the 
Nuclear Weapons opinion, it had “rejected” the argument that 
“the Covenant was directed to the protection of human rights in 
peacetime, but that questions relating to unlawful loss of life in 
hostilities were governed by the law applicable in armed con-
 
 43. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.  
 44. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8. 
 45. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relevance 
of Paragraph 25 of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, 98 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 358, 359 (2004) (arguing that paragraph 25 of the Nucle-
ar Weapons opinion “serves to reinforce the consistent trend in human rights 
case law that the individual is entitled to both human rights and humanitari-
an law protection in complementary fashion in time of armed conflict”). 
 47. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25. 
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flict.”48 It states, “the Court considers that the protection of-
fered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of 
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for deroga-
tion.”49 Instead, “the Court will have to take into consideration 
both these branches of international law, namely human rights 
law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”50 
The Complementarity Model is also reflected in General 
Comments by the U.N. Human Rights Committee.51 The Com-
mittee stated the proposition directly in General Comment 31: 
“While, in respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules 
of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for 
the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both 
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.”52  
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
also been a leading advocate of this approach.53 Speaking be-
fore the 27th Annual Round Table on Current Problems of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law, Jakob Kellenberger, President 
of the ICRC, took the position that the bodies of law are “dis-
tinct but complementary.”54 Although acknowledging differ-
ences in the law—for example, that some human rights law re-
quirements are derogable while humanitarian law is always 
nonderogable—he maintained that these differences did not 
render the bodies of law “mutually exclusive.”55 
The recent jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights is also most consistent with the Complementarity Mod-
el. Bámaca Velásquez represents the high-water mark of the 
 
 48. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 105 (July 9) (quotation 
omitted). See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 216–20 (Dec. 19); Construc-
tion of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. ¶¶ 102–13. 
 49. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 106. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 8–9. See generally Human 
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004); Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
 52. General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, supra note 51, ¶ 11. 
 53. See Kellenberger, supra note 42. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
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Inter-American Court’s application of the model.56 The Inter-
American Court explained: “the relevant provisions of the Ge-
neva Convention may be taken into consideration as elements 
for the interpretation of the American Convention.”57 Hence, 
the American Convention—a human rights agreement—
remained fully operative and compatible with humanitarian 
law during armed conflict. 
In Coard v. United States, the Inter-American Commission 
was more restrained. It held that “while international humani-
tarian law pertains primarily in times of war and the interna-
tional law of human rights applies most fully in times of peace, 
the potential application of one does not necessarily exclude or 
displace the other.”58 The Commission then went on to note 
that humanitarian law could help to define whether detention 
was “arbitrary” under the terms of Articles I and XXV of the 
American Declaration.59  
The qualifying adverb “necessarily” illustrates a key weak-
nesses of the Complementarity Model: it is grounded in the as-
sumption that conflicts between the two systems of law are al-
ways reconcilable through complementary interpretation.60 As 
described in greater detail in Part IV, however, there are some 
circumstances in which it is not possible to reconcile conflicts 
between the two bodies of law in this way. One example is the 
treatment of persons captured during armed conflict: humani-
tarian law specifies that “combatants” be held as POWs until 
the end of hostilities (and then returned), while human rights 
law specifies that detainees be tried for their offenses and de-
tained only if convicted and then only for the period of the sen-
tence.61 Clearly, humanitarian law envisions uniform-wearing 
 
 56. Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 70 (Nov. 25, 2000), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/ 
articulos/Seriec_70_ing.pdf; see also Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary 
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 67 (Feb. 4, 2000), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_67_ing.pdf (also following 
the complementarity model); Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 9–10 (ex-
plaining the Inter-American Court’s decisions). 
 57. Bámaca-Velásquez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 209. 
 58. Coard v. United States, Inter-Am. C. H.R., Rep. No. 109/99, ¶ 39 
(Sept. 29, 1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/cases/us109-99.html. 
 59. Id. ¶ 42. 
 60. For states willing to follow formal derogation procedures, these con-
flicts may, however, be avoided for most conflicts. See infra notes 157–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 61. See infra Part IV.B. 
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soldiers who enjoy POW status, while human rights law envi-
sions civilians improperly swept up in an armed conflict who 
enjoy the right to trial and then to release. But what if the per-
son captured was a civilian taking part in hostilities? The Com-
plementarity Model does not offer a tool for determining which 
body of law applies when the two bodies of law are irreconcilable.  
A second weakness of the Complementarity Model is that 
the interpretive tools it does provide may undermine the very 
norms the model seeks to protect. In cases of tension between 
the two bodies of law, those applying a complementarity ap-
proach must engage in compromise to achieve harmony. This 
compromise might require the dilution of both bodies of law to 
force them into a relationship of interpretation. Or it might 
consist of rhetorical acrobatics that pay lip service, rather than 
do justice, to a rule on one side of a normative conflict. Even if 
this leads to the “right” outcome as applied, it creates potential-
ly damaging precedent by eviscerating a rule that might 
properly apply in full force in another context.  
The model described next—the Conflict Resolution Model—
allows the two bodies of law to be interpreted together. Unlike 
the Complementarity Model, however, the Conflict Resolution 
Model also accounts for the existence of true conflicts between 
the two bodies of law and provides a tool for resolving them. 
C. THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION MODEL 
The Conflict Resolution Model provides that when an 
armed conflict is present, human rights law and humanitarian 
law are applied as they would be under the Complementarity 
Model unless they are in conflict. If they conflict, however, the 
model offers three possible decision rules for deciding the ap-
propriate body of law to be applied.  
As under the Complementarity Model, the existence of an 
armed conflict does not immediately invalidate human rights 
law within the zone of armed conflict. Instead, the existence of 
an armed conflict simply prompts an inquiry into whether hu-
man rights law and humanitarian law inform, or conflict with, 
one another. In this model, then, human rights law and hu-
manitarian law obligations that govern the same conduct can 
have either “relationships of interpretation” or “relationships of 
conflict.”62 The International Law Commission explains these 
terms as follows: 
 
 62. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
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 Relationships of interpretation. This is the case where 
one norm assists in the interpretation of another. A norm 
may assist in the interpretation of another norm for ex-
ample as an application, clarification, updating, or modi-
fication of the latter. In such situation, both norms are 
applied in conjunction. 
 Relationships of conflict. This is the case where two legal 
rules that are both valid and applicable point to incom-
patible decisions so that a choice must be made between 
them.63  
Under the Conflict Resolution Model, when legal rules (or 
norms) drawn from the two bodies of law have a “relationship 
of interpretation,” one legal rule assists in the interpretation of 
another. In such cases, it is unnecessary to choose between the 
two applicable legal rules.64 In cases where human rights law 
and humanitarian law have a “relationship of conflict,” howev-
er, the “valid and applicable” legal rules drawn from each body 
of law create incommensurate requirements.65 As a result, it is 
necessary to look to conflict resolution rules to choose between 
the two.66 
Relationships of conflict may take two forms. The first is a 
conflict between an obligation and a permission. Many humani-
tarian law rules that conflict with human rights law may be 
characterized as permissive exceptions to baseline peacetime 
norms carved out to accommodate military necessity. For ex-
ample, humanitarian law grants States limited permission to 
take the lives of combatants in the course of armed conflict.67 
The second form of conflict is a conflict between two sets of ob-
ligations. This category includes situations in which a human 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Droege, supra note 38, at 523–24. This suggests yet a third read-
ing of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons decision (or, perhaps more accurately, a dif-
ferent way of presenting the second reading): the lex specialis provides guid-
ance about the application of the lex generalis to a specific circumstance, as 
humanitarian law informed the application of Article 6 of the ICCPR to armed 
conflict in Nuclear Weapons. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 6(1) (“Every hu-
man being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). 
 65. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 2. 
 66. See id. 
 67. It is also possible, although less common, for humanitarian law to im-
pose an obligation where human rights law is permissive. For example, human 
rights law would permit a state to impose sanctions for certain crimes for 
which humanitarian law obligates States to grant immunity. See infra Part 
IV.B. 
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rights law obligation conflicts with a humanitarian law obliga-
tion such that it is impossible to comply with one without vio-
lating another. For example, humanitarian law obligates States 
to observe and protect local customs. When these local customs 
are contrary to human rights law obligations (for example, ob-
ligations to protect women from discrimination under the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women), the state actor might face a conflict between 
two sets of obligations.68  
Figure 3 illustrates the decision-making process under the 
Conflict Resolution Model. When the two bodies of law are in a 
“relationship of interpretation,” they are applied in conjunction 
with one another. The Conflict Resolution Model always treats 
situations in which legal rules are in a relationship of interpre-
tation as they would be treated under the Complementarity 
Model. Hence, the Conflict Resolution Model is rooted in a nar-
rower reading of the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, 
in which the use of the word “arbitrary” in Article 6 of the 
ICCPR creates enough space for humanitarian law to define 
the boundaries of permissible killing without creating a norma-
tive conflict.69 This illustrates the analytical process that goes 
into finding “relationships of interpretation” between the two 
sets of legal rules.70  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68. See infra Part IV.C. 
 69. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8). 
 70. For more on this reading of the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, see 
supra text accompanying notes 45–48. 
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Figure 3 
Conflict Resolution Model 
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When legal rules are in a “relationship of conflict,” the Con-
flict Resolution model acknowledges that a decision maker 
must select a rule to resolve the conflict. In this respect, it dif-
fers from the Complementarity Model, which does not 
acknowledge that there can be such irreconcilable conflict. It 
differs from the Displacement Model, as well, in that it only 
provides for displacement of human rights law by humanitari-
an law in cases where the two bodies of law conflict, leaving 
harmonious legal rules intact. As the International Law Com-
mission has explained, “The maxim lex specialis derogat legi 
generali is a generally accepted technique of interpretation and 
conflict resolution in international law. It suggests that when-
ever two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, pri-
ority should be given to the norm that is more specific.”71  
In practice, three different rules have been applied to re-
solve conflicts between the two bodies of law. We term these 
three rules “event-specific displacement,” “reverse event-
specific displacement,” and “specificity.” When dealing with re-
lationships of conflict, actors following the Conflict Resolution 
Model will arrive at different conclusions depending on which 
of the three decision rules for conflict resolution they select. We 
discuss each rule briefly in turn. 
1. Rule 1: Event-Specific Displacement 
An event-specific displacement approach holds that hu-
manitarian law displaces human rights law during times of 
armed conflict, but only in the context of specific events in 
which the relevant norms of each body of law conflict. Whereas 
the Displacement Model outlined in Part II.A provides for dis-
placement at the level of the armed conflict or military opera-
tion, the event-specific displacement version of the Conflict 
Resolution Model applies displacement only to the specific 
event in question. Hence human rights law may apply during 
times of armed conflict to events or situations where humani-
tarian law does not conflict. Where there is a conflict, the 
event-specific displacement rule of conflict resolution provides 
that humanitarian law is always the lex specialis.  
The ICJ’s Wall decision can be read to support this ap-
proach. Although the ICJ Wall decision accepts the applicabil-
ity of human rights law during hostilities, it states that human-
itarian law is the lex specialis: “In order to answer the question 
 
 71. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 10, ¶ 5. 
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put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both 
these branches of international law, namely human rights law 
and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian law.”72 It is 
possible to read this to support the view that humanitarian law 
prevails in instances where the two conflict. That said, this is 
only one possible reading, as the ICJ does not, in its decision, 
elect to apply humanitarian law over human rights law. Such a 
choice was not necessary in the case, because the legal rules in 
question—concerning annexation—were in a relationship of  
interpretation.73  
In contrast to the Israeli government, which, as noted ear-
lier, has advocated the Displacement Model,74 the Israeli High 
Court has adopted a position that appears to be consistent with 
an event-specific displacement approach. In Public Committee 
Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, more com-
monly known as the Targeted Killings Case,75 the High Court 
concludes that “humanitarian law is the lex specialis 
which applies in the case of an armed conflict.”76 However, 
“[w]hen there is a gap (lacuna) in that law, it can be supple-
mented by human rights law.”77 In other words, human rights 
law does apply in armed conflict, but only when it is not in con-
flict with humanitarian law. In this case, the court uses human 
rights law to inform humanitarian law. Additional Protocol I of 
the Geneva Conventions provides that “civilians shall enjoy the 
protections afforded by this section, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities.”78 In interpreting the Pro-
tocol, the Court appeals to human rights standards articulated 
by the European Court of Human Rights, concluding that “if a 
terrorist taking a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, in-
terrogated, and tried, those are the means which should be em-
ployed.”79 Yet in determining that civilians directly participat-
 
 72. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9). 
 73. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 123–30. 
 74. See supra Part II.A.  
 75. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Govern-
ment of Israel 57(6) IsrSC 285 [2006] (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ 
ENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.htm [hereinafter Targeted Killings Case]; 
see Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 42. Note that, like the Israeli execu-
tive branch, the High Court treats the situation in the Occupied Territories as 
an IAC, rather than an occupation. 
 76. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 75, ¶ 18. 
 77. Id. 
 78. AP I, supra note 21, art. 51(3). 
 79. Targeted Killings Case, supra note 75, ¶ 40. The court uses similar 
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ing in hostilities may be killed by the State without trial, the 
court directly applies humanitarian law to the exclusion of hu-
man rights law. Thus, by considering human rights law where 
it is not inconsistent with humanitarian law, but treating hu-
manitarian law as the lex specialis, the Israeli High Court ar-
guably employs an event-specific displacement rule of conflict 
resolution.  
The Government of Australia has also adopted the event-
specific displacement approach. “If Australia were exercising 
authority as a consequence of an occupation or during a con-
sensual deployment with the consent of a Host State, in cir-
cumstances in which the principles of international humanitar-
ian law applied,” it explained, “Australia accepts that there is 
some scope for the rights under the [ICCPR] to remain applica-
ble, although in case of conflict between the applicable stand-
ards under the Covenant and the standards of international 
humanitarian law, the latter applies as lex specialis.”80 Thus, 
human rights law is not entirely displaced by humanitarian 
law during times of armed conflict, but, again, humanitarian 
law prevails in event-specific cases of conflict.  
The event-specific decision rule is attractive in part be-
cause it adopts the simplicity of the Displacement Model, but in 
a more fine-grained manner. It allows human rights law to re-
main applicable in all but those specific situations in which 
there is direct conflict between the two bodies of law. When the 
two bodies of law do conflict, it provides a clear and straight-
forward decision rule: displace human rights law with humani-
tarian law. Yet again the simplicity comes at a cost. Event-
specific displacement denies that human rights law may be bet-
ter designed to regulate certain hostile situations. It is there-
fore not well suited to the increasingly common situations in 
which armed conflict takes place outside the traditional battle-
field. Moreover, by always displacing human rights law it 
comes into conflict with humanitarian law, this approach could 
deny jurisdiction to human rights treaty-based judicial bodies 
in cases in which a State allegedly violated its human rights 
obligations.  
 
reasoning to conclude that the state must follow up any targeted killing with 
an independent investigation, an human rights law duty for which the Court 
again cites European Court of Human Rights cases and other human rights 
authorities. Id. 
 80. Human Rights Comm., Replies to the List of Issues To Be Taken Up in 
Connection With the Consideration of the Fifth Periodic Report of the Gov-
ernment of Australia, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/AUS/Q/5/Add.1 (Feb. 5, 2009). 
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2. Rule 2: Reverse Event-Specific Displacement 
The reverse event-specific displacement rule is, as its name 
suggests, the mirror image of the event-specific displacement 
rule: While the event-specific displacement rule always resolves 
conflicts between the two bodies of law in favor of human rights 
law, the reverse event-specific displacement rule always re-
solves conflicts between the two bodies of law in favor of human 
rights law. Unlike the other two rules described here, the re-
verse event-specific displacement rule has resulted entirely 
from jurisdictional constraints on the courts themselves.  
Two courts—the Inter-American Court for Human Rights 
and the European Court of Human Rights—apply this rule be-
cause their primary jurisdictional mandate is to interpret hu-
man rights treaties.81 Thus, while they may look to humanitar-
ian law norms for guidance in interpretation, their mandates 
create a decision rule that favors human rights law.  
To illustrate, consider the Inter-American Court for Hu-
man Rights’ Las Palmeras decision. There the court criticized 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for directly 
applying humanitarian law norms that are not present in, and 
conflict with, the American Convention on Human Rights. The 
Inter-American Court conceded that it may evaluate “any norm 
of domestic or international law applied by a State, in times of 
peace or armed conflict,” but it clarified that it was competent 
only to determine if the norm “is compatible or not with the 
American Convention,” which codifies applicable human rights 
law.82 It continued: 
In order to carry out this examination, the Court interprets the norm 
in question and analyzes it in the light of the provisions of the Con-
vention. The result of this operation will always be an opinion in 
which the Court will say whether or not that norm or that fact is 
compatible with the American Convention. The latter has only given 
the Court competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of 
the States are compatible with the Convention itself, and not with the 
1949 Geneva Conventions.83 
 
 81. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (establishing the ECHR); Charter 
of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2420, as 
amended by The Protocol of Buenos Aires art. 106, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
607 (providing that the “principal function shall be to promote the observance 
and protection of human rights”). 
 82. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 32 (Feb. 4, 2000). 
 83. Id. ¶ 33. 
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Thus, when humanitarian law is incompatible with the 
American Convention—where the legal rules from each body of 
law share a relationship of conflict—the court is jurisdictionally 
constrained to base its judgment on the American Convention 
only.84 
The European Court of Human Rights has similar re-
strictions. It, too, is strictly limited to adjudicating cases under 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which codifies ap-
plicable human rights law.85 In McCann v. United Kingdom, 
the European Court found that the United Kingdom had violat-
ed Article 2 of the European Convention in its antiterrorist op-
erations against Irish Republican Army operatives in Gibral-
tar.86 Although the European Court acknowledged that the 
soldiers reasonably perceived the use of lethal force to be neces-
sary, it held in favor of McCann because the operation was not 
designed to make killing a last resort, as required under hu-
man rights law.87 Hence, it applied human rights law to the ex-
clusion of humanitarian law where the two were in conflict.  
The reverse event-specific displacement rule has thus far 
been applied only by courts that have exclusive jurisdiction 
over human rights law. Like event-specific displacement, it has 
the virtue of simplicity. But it is unlikely to be widely adopted 
because it is plagued by the same problem as event-specific 
displacement, but in mirror image: reverse event-specific dis-
placement denies the reality that humanitarian rights law may 
sometimes be better designed to regulate certain hostile situa-
tions. We thus turn to the third and final decision rule. 
3. Rule 3: Specificity 
The rule of specificity provides that in relationships of con-
flict between the two bodies of law, the law more specifically 
tailored to the situation prevails.88 As with the other rules out-
lined here, the specificity rule applies at the level of an event or 
 
 84. See also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 9. 
 85. For an extensive discussion of European Court of Human Rights 
treatment of conduct in armed conflict, see id. at 19–21. 
 86. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 64 (1995) 
(holding by a ten to nine vote a violation of Article 2 of the Convention). For 
other examples of European Court of Human Rights cases employing this ap-
proach, see Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 
(2005); Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38 (2005). 
 87. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20–90; see also Dannenbaum 
Memo, supra note 30, at 19. 
 88. See Droege, supra note 38, at 522–23.  
 2012] LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1911 
 
situation rather than at the level of the armed conflict. In con-
trast with the other two decision rules, however, the specificity 
rule does not presuppose that either humanitarian law or hu-
man rights law is always the lex specialis. Rather, it looks to 
which body of law is more specific to the situation at hand.89  
This approach to resolving the conflict between humanitar-
ian law and human rights law is the best available approach to 
a complex problem. The specificity approach gives the widest 
possible ambit for complementary application of the two bodies 
of law—applying the two together when they are consistent or 
“regulate different aspects of a situation or regulate a situation 
in more or less detail”90—while addressing the inevitable con-
flicts by tailoring the legal rule to the context in which it oper-
ates. Whereas the other two conflict resolution rules ignore the 
situational context by predetermining which law should apply 
to it, the specificity rule allows for tailoring the choice of law to 
best suit the particular situation. It therefore avoids many of 
the weaknesses of other models, while offering a key benefit of 
its own.  
But it has a notable drawback. In contrast with the event-
specific displacement and reverse event-specific displacement 
rules, the specificity approach lacks a consistent preemption 
rule and the simplicity that comes with it. Instead of always 
applying humanitarian law over human rights law in cases of 
conflict between the two bodies of law or vice versa, it calls for a 
judgment to be made regarding the most relevant law in each 
instance. Indeed, a key feature of the specificity approach is its 
dependence on facts—as circumstances change, so will the most 
specific law.  
The specificity rule’s greatest strength is therefore also its 
greatest weakness: because the relevant law changes depend-
ing on the situation, the approach may seem impractical or 
unworkable.91 The numerous considerations add nuance but al-
so make the rule difficult to apply absent specific contextual 
facts. Although very useful for ex post review of conduct during 
 
 89. Id. at 524. 
 90. Droege, supra note 31, at 343–44. 
 91. The Legal Advisor for the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Cordula Droege, notes, “[t]here may be controversy as to which norm is more 
specialized in a concrete situation,” and indeed an abstract determination of 
an entire area of law as being more specific towards another area of law is not, 
in effect, realistic. Id. at 340; see Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 11. 
Note that this position differs from the official position of the ICRC, which fa-
vors the complementarity approach. See Kellenberger, supra note 42.  
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armed conflict, the rule complicates ex ante decision making, 
particularly on the ground.  
Yet the weakness is not as severe as it may at first seem. 
Truly unavoidable relationships of conflict between the two 
bodies of law are discrete, predictable, and rare.92 Most human 
rights norms are derogable in times of emergency.93 Moreover, 
because relationships of conflict may be accounted for ex ante, 
some legal rules are clearly identifiable as the lex specialis by 
their design. For example, humanitarian law regulating treat-
ment of POWs is specifically and clearly designed to apply to 
any instance in which a State captures members of the armed 
forces of a state with which it is engaged in armed conflict.94 
Only in a few, limited cases will it be difficult to predict which 
body of law will provide the lex specialis. In these cases, it is 
not clear that other models for resolving conflict between the 
two bodies of law serve decision makers any better. For exam-
ple, the Displacement Model is straightforward once one identi-
fies the zone of armed conflict, but that preliminary inquiry is 
highly complicated and becomes extremely high-stakes.  
Using the Conflict Resolution Model as a guide, govern-
ment policy makers can identify foreseeable relationships of 
conflict and develop rules to address them.95 These individuals 
are well-positioned to apply the specificity rule with all its 
complexities and convert their conclusions into manuals, like 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. That way, on-the-ground 
decision makers can apply rules that have already been run 
through the Conflict Resolution Model. This underscores the 
importance of carefully examining these two bodies of law be-
fore making critical policy decisions. This kind of approach can 
achieve predictability, protection of human dignity, and deci-
siveness on the battlefield.  
We turn in the next Part to explaining the specificity rule 
of the conflict resolution model in greater detail, showing how it 
has been used by international bodies and states in practice, 
and outlining five key factors that should guide those using the 
rule to determine the applicable body of law. 
 
 92. See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 
13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753, 756 (2002). 
 93. See infra Part IV. 
 94. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) 
(outlining the treatment of POWs in armed conflicts). 
 95. See infra Part IV. 
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III.  THE SPECIFICITY RULE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION   
The specificity rule of conflict resolution applies humani-
tarian and human rights law in conjunction—using them to in-
form one another—whenever possible. When the two bodies of 
law are in direct conflict, however, it provides a decision rule 
for choosing between the two that turns on which legal rule is 
most specific to the situation.  
To illustrate this approach, we begin here by showing how 
the specificity model has been used in real-world situations to 
resolve conflicts between the two bodies of law, demonstrating 
that courts can and have successfully apply the test. Second, to 
further clarify the test and show how it may be applied to a 
wide variety of situations in which there is a conflict between 
human rights law and humanitarian law, we outline and de-
scribe five factors to guide the choice between the two bodies of 
law. This sets the stage for the next Part, in which we describe 
four specific conflicts between humanitarian law and human 
rights law and show how they can be best resolved using this 
specificity rule. 
A. THE SPECIFICITY RULE IN PRACTICE  
The specificity approach has been adopted and used by 
States to resolve specific conflicts. A number of countries, in-
cluding Canada and Germany, have indicated that they sub-
scribe to versions of this approach. For instance, in a brief in 
Amnesty International Canada v. Chief of the Defence Staff for 
the Canadian Forces, the Canadian Government stated: 
A state’s international human rights obligations, to the extent that 
they have extraterritorial effect, are not displaced [in armed conflict]. 
However, the relevant human rights principles can only be decided by 
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict, the lex specialis of 
IHL: Critically, in the event of an apparent inconsistency in the con-
tent of the two strands of law, the more specific provisions will pre-
vail: in relation to targeting in the conduct of hostilities, for example, 
human rights law will refer to more specific provisions (the lex 
specialis) of humanitarian law.96 
Canada thus argued that humanitarian law is more specific to 
the conduct under review—“targeting in the conduct of hostili-
ties”—and therefore it is the lex specialis. The government is 
 
 96. Respondents’ Factum Re: Determination of Two Questions, Pursuant 
to Rule 107 of the Federal Courts Rules, Regarding the Application of the Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at 26, Amnesty Int’l Canada v. Cana-
da [2009] 4 F.C.R. 149 (No. T-324-07) (Can.) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
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careful to note that only “specific provisions . . . of humanitari-
an law” become the lex specialis, not the entire body of law. 
The German Government has taken a similar stance, tai-
loring its instructions to the relevant body of law as follows: 
Wherever its police or armed forces are deployed abroad, in particular 
when participating in peace missions, Germany ensures to all persons 
that they will be granted the rights recognized in the [ICCPR], insofar 
as they are subject to its jurisdiction . . . . The training it gives its se-
curity forces for international missions includes tailor-made instruc-
tion in the provisions of the Covenant.97  
Many State parties to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child98 have also adopted the specificity approach in drafting 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.99 The 
Protocol prohibits state parties and non-state armed parties 
from recruiting children for military service in armed con-
flicts.100 In the preamble, state parties recall their obligations 
to protect children from violence under human rights and hu-
manitarian law, but they emphasize their duties under the lat-
ter.101 The Protocol specifies that state parties should use the 
specificity approach when human rights and humanitarian ob-
ligations conflict, applying the body of law most able to protect 
children from violence: “Nothing in the present Protocol shall 
be construed as precluding provisions in the law of a State Par-
ty or in international instruments and international humani-
tarian law that are more conducive to the realization of the 
rights of the child.”102  
Three separate Inter-American Commission decisions illus-
trate the three different outcomes that can result from using 
 
 97. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comments by the Government of Germa-
ny to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/CO/80/DEU/Add.1, at 3 (Apr. 11, 2005).  
 98. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 99. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, 54th Sess, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/54/263 (May 25, 2000). 
 100. Id. arts. 1–4. 
 101. The Preamble to the Optional Protocol notes the various prohibitions 
on violence against children in armed conflict in the Rome Statute, ICRC 
commentary, and International Labour Organization Convention No. 182. It 
further recalls generally “the obligation of each party to an armed conflict to 
abide by the provisions of international humanitarian law.” Id. pmbl. 
 102. Id. art. 5. 
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the specificity version of the Conflict Resolution Model.103 First, 
in Avilán v. Colombia, the Inter-American Commission found a 
relationship of interpretation among human rights law and 
humanitarian law governing the extrajudicial execution of in-
dividuals hors de combat.104 In that opinion, the Commission 
reasoned that “[i]t is precisely in situations of internal armed 
conflict that human rights and humanitarian law converge 
most precisely and reinforce one another.”105 This decision il-
lustrates the way in which the specificity model—like the other 
conflict resolution models—applies both bodies of law in a rela-
tionship of interpretation whenever possible. 
Second, in Abella v. Argentina, the Inter-American Com-
mission resolved a conflict between the two bodies of law in fa-
vor of humanitarian law. The case required the Commission to 
determine whether the killing of attackers in the La Tablada 
battle in Argentina violated Article 4 of the American Conven-
tion.106 After noting that Article 4 creates a non-derogable right 
to life, the Commission determined that it provides little guid-
ance in situations of armed conflict, as it does not distinguish 
between civilians and combatants. Instead, the Inter-American 
Commission turned to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions to conclude that there had been no rights violation.107 
Upon identifying the casualties as combatants, the Inter-
American Commission did not consider any human rights law-
based “requirements to warn, attempt to arrest, or shoot to in-
jure rather than kill.”108 There was a relationship of conflict be-
tween these potential human rights law obligations, rooted in 
the American Convention, and the implicit humanitarian law 
permission to abandon these precautions in battle. The Inter-
American Commission resolved the conflict in favor of humani-
tarian law because humanitarian law was more specifically tai-
lored to the situation.  
 
 103. This is the same tripartite structure that Tom Dannenbaum ultimate-
ly recommends in his memo to the Lowenstein Clinic. See Dannenbaum 
Memo, supra note 30, at 69. 
 104. Avilán v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
26/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 140 (1997). 
 105. Id. ¶ 174. Note that the same is arguably true of occupation. See infra 
text accompanying note 108. For a further explanation of the case, see 
Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 31–33. 
 106. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 5 (1997). 
 107. Id. ¶¶ 156, 161, 188; see also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 
30–31.  
 108. Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 31. 
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Third, in its Third Report on the Human Rights Situation 
in Colombia,109 the Inter-American Commission resolved a con-
flict between the two bodies of law in favor of human rights law, 
despite the fact that it acknowledged the existence of an armed 
conflict in the country.110 The Inter-American Commission ap-
plied humanitarian law to certain conduct within Colombia. 
But when faced with the extrajudicial killings of “marginal 
groups” engaged in criminal activities, it applied a “pure” human 
rights law enforcement standard.111 Even though humanitarian 
law exists for situations of non-international armed conflict, the 
Commission found human rights law to be more specifically tai-
lored to the State’s treatment of criminal activity.112  
Thus, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission 
demonstrates the full range of outcomes possible under the 
specificity approach. By applying a specificity rule of conflict 
resolution, the Inter-American Commission has determined 
that the governing body of law depends on the relationship be-
tween the applicable legal rules and the particular circum-
stances to which the legal rules are to be applied. Put different-
ly, the Commission has found itself, at different times, at each 
possible outcome of the Conflict Resolution Model. 
Together, these examples demonstrate that although the 
specificity rule is more complex than either the event-specific or 
reverse event-specific displacement rules, governments, courts, 
and international organizations have nonetheless successfully 
used the approach. In doing so, they have applied legal rules 
that are most appropriate and most closely tailored to the cir-
cumstances of the case, giving maximum effect to each body of 
law in situations in which they are most specific and relevant.  
Yet more still can be done to clarify this approach and 
thereby make it more functional and accessible to a wider vari-
ety of decision makers. In the next Section, we begin this pro-
ject by outlining five factors that should be used in applying the 
specificity rule. These five factors offer detailed guidance to de-
 
 109. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation 
in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Colombia 
Report]. 
 110. See id. ch. 1, at ¶ 20 (discussing how drug trafficking groups “began to 
finance and support the paramilitary groups”). 
 111. See id. ch. 4, at ¶ 213 (applying Article 4 of the American Convention 
to police responses to the “marginal groups”). 
 112. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 33–34, for a more detailed 
account of the case. 
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cision makers seeking to determine which body of law is more 
specific to any particular event.  
B. FIVE FACTORS FOR DETERMINING SPECIFICITY 
Drawing on a variety of sources—including prior case law, 
scholarship, and governing treaties—we propose five factors to 
guide States and courts in using the specificity rule to choose 
between humanitarian law and human rights law in the event 
of an irreconcilable conflict between them. To determine which 
body of law is more specific, States and courts should consider: 
(1) the wording and content of the norms themselves; (2) the 
nature of the norms in question, (3) whether a State exercises 
effective control, (4) expressions of intent by parties to relevant 
treaties, and (5) state practice. We discuss each in turn. 
1. Wording and Content of Norms 
As a starting point, it is important to look to the text of the 
rule of law that is being applied. When a norm uses terms that 
make it uniquely relevant to the conduct at hand, that rule 
may become the lex specialis.113 For this reason, much existing 
practice favors treating humanitarian law as the lex specialis 
during instances of armed conflict.114 For example, in determin-
ing the proper treatment of combatants involved in an armed 
conflict, humanitarian law frequently is treated as the lex 
specialis because, among other things, it distinguishes between 
combatants and civilians.115 There is still room, however, for 
human rights law to prevail in special circumstances, especially 
during occupation and non-international armed conflict; it is in 
these circumstances that the specificity approach is most likely 
to depart from the event-specific displacement approach out-
lined above.116  
 
 113. See Droege, supra note 38, at 522 (“[The concept of lex specialis] stems 
from a Roman principle of interpretation according to which, in situations es-
pecially regulated by a specific rule, this rule would displace the more general 
rule.”). 
 114. See Droege, supra note 31, at 318 (“As is well-known, most human 
rights can be derogated from in time of public emergency, which includes situ-
ations of armed conflict.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶¶ 152–53 (1997) (discussing 
the application of humanitarian law to the conflict). 
 116. See Droege, supra note 38, at 524–29 (noting the complex interplay of 
human rights law and humanitarian law in the areas of occupation and 
noninternational armed conflict). 
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2. The Nature of the Norms in Question 
In addition to the wording and content, it is important to 
consider the nature of the norms in question. For example, does 
the relationship of conflict exist between a human rights law 
obligation and a humanitarian law permission or does it exist 
between two obligations?117 As noted above, in many cases hu-
manitarian law creates permissions—exceptions carved out to 
accommodate military necessity (for example, permission to kill 
enemy combatants in the context of armed conflict).118 Humani-
tarian law also generates obligations, some of which may create 
protections that even go beyond those provided by human 
rights law (for example, the obligation not to try POWs and to 
release them at the end of the armed conflict).119 Where hu-
manitarian law creates an obligation on a State, it is more like-
ly to be the lex specialis.120 In contrast, whether a humanitari-
an law permission is the lex specialis depends largely on the 
other four factors.  
3. Effective Control 
There is an emerging international consensus that states 
have an obligation to obverse human rights obligations wher-
ever they exercise effective control. Effective control is also an 
important factor for determining whether humanitarian law or 
human rights law is more specific to a particular situation. 
Where a State exercises greater effective control on the ground, 
that counsels in favor of applying human rights law as the 
more specifically tailored and relevant body of law.121 For in-
stance, in occupation,122 a state actor may exercise significant 
territorial control, and therefore human rights law may be the 
more specific body of law applicable to that State’s actions.123 
 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
 118. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 3–8 (discussing how combatants are 
viewed under humanitarian law). 
 119. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (relating to the treatment of POWs 
during armed conflict). 
 120. Cf. Droege, supra note 38, at 524 (stating that if a rule creates an ex-
ception to a general rule it is more likely to be the lex specialis, which would 
be the case if a rule created a permission). 
 121. Cf. id. at 525–29 (discussing how humanitarian law rests in part on 
the premise that a government needs to be able to weaken the military forces 
of its enemies).  
 122. See id. at 537–39 (describing occupation and how humanitarian ver-
sus human rights law could apply). 
 123. See, e.g., Human Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of 
the Covenant: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
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Conversely, when States exercise less control, humanitarian 
law is more likely to be the appropriate body of law in cases of 
conflict between the two.124 Paradigmatically, the scope of 
States’ human rights obligations is limited during battlefield 
hostilities because the States lack effective control.125 During 
active armed conflict, the exigencies of war expand the scope of 
permissible action, while chaos, fear, and timing limit the ca-
pacity of States to meet obligations reasonably expected of 
them in other contexts, counseling in favor of applying humani-
tarian law as the lex specialis.126  
U.N. bodies have endorsed the view that state actors have 
greater responsibility to honor human rights obligations when 
and where they exercise greater effective control, particularly 
during occupation.127 The U.N. General Assembly cautioned the 
Soviet Union about its human rights obligations during its oc-
cupation of Hungary as early as 1956.128 In 1967, during the 
Six Days War, the U.N. General Assembly reminded Israel that 
“essential and inalienable human rights should be respected 
even during the vicissitudes of war.”129 The unique nature of 
occupation may also explain why the ICJ changed the tenor of 
its jurisprudence on this question in DRC v. Uganda.130 In that 
case, it did not identify humanitarian law as the lex specialis—
as it had in its Nuclear Weapons and Wall opinions—but in-
stead emphasized its earlier statements on the applicability of 
human rights law to extraterritorial State activity during  
occupation.131  
 
Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/CRP.4/Rev.6 (May 26, 
2004) (using a government’s “effective control” of a territory in determining 
which body of international law applies). 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Droege, supra note 31, at 330 (“[W]ith varying degrees of control, 
the state has varying obligations, going from the duty to respect to the duties 
to protect and fulfil [sic] human rights.”). 
 126. See id. at 347 (arguing that humanitarian law should apply in situa-
tions where “government forces [have] no real control” over the situation); see 
also Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 11 (citing Droege, supra note 31)). 
 127. See Droege, supra note 38, at 537–39 (describing occupation’s implica-
tions for determining the applicable rule of law). 
 128. Id. at 504–05; see also G.A. Res. 1312 (XIII), 13th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/38/49 (Dec. 12, 1958). 
 129. S.C. Res. 237, pmbl. ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/237/1967 (June 14, 1967). 
 130. See Droege, supra note 31, at 522 (discussing the ICJ’s seemingly in-
explicable change of course in this case). 
 131. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19, 2005).  
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As the ICJ’s opinion in DRC v. Uganda reveals, effective 
control has gained traction as the guiding principle for extra-
territorial application of human rights.132 It is important to 
note, however, that effective control factors into the equation 
differently when it is used to determine whether human rights 
law preempts humanitarian law than when it is used to deter-
mine whether human rights law applies at all.133 The two ap-
plications dovetail in DRC v. Uganda because their underlying 
premise is the same: territorial control increases the responsi-
bility of the State to fulfill its human rights obligations.134 
Thus, according to some, human rights law sometimes 
preempts humanitarian law in zones of effective control.135 But 
the difference in the question—does human rights law apply, as 
opposed to does human rights law preempt—can lead to very 
different outcomes.  
First, in addition to being arguably dispositive outside the 
sovereign territory of a State in determining the applicability of 
human rights law, effective control is also a relevant considera-
tion within the sovereign territory when used as a component 
of the specificity approach.136 While human rights law pre-
sumptively applies within the sovereign territory—thus requir-
ing no effective control test—it does not necessarily preempt 
humanitarian law in situations of a noninternational armed 
conflict that occurs entirely within the sovereign territory of a 
single State.137 A court applying the specificity rule of conflict 
 
 132. See Hathaway et al., supra note 27, at 390 (discussing how most in-
ternational jurisdictions have adopted the “effective control” test).  
 133. See, e.g., id. at 393–94 (discussing the competing arguments as to 
whether the Covenant or Convention Against Torture apply to U.S. actions 
abroad). 
 134. See Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 189 (“The DRC charges that Uganda 
breached its obligation of vigilance incumbent upon it as an occupying Power 
by failing to enforce respect for human rights and international humanitarian 
law in the occupied regions, and particularly in Ituri.”). 
 135. See, e.g., id. ¶ 248 (“The Court further observes that the fact that 
Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district . . . extends Uganda’s obliga-
tion to take appropriate measures to prevent the looting, plundering and ex-
ploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private per-
sons in this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces.”). 
 136. See, e.g., Droege, supra note 38, at 527 (“[ I ]t is relatively uncontrover-
sial that the rules regulating the conduct of hostilities . . . are part of a cus-
tomary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts.”). 
 137. See id. at 530–33 (surveying the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the issue of whether human rights law preempts humani-
tarian law in these situations). 
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resolution might consider the degree to which the government 
of that State exercises effective control over the hostile situa-
tion to determine whether human rights law or humanitarian 
law prevails in that situation.138 
Second, in determining the lex specialis, the presence of ef-
fective control is not decisive by itself.139 For example, prisoners 
of war may be within the effective control of a State, but the 
wording and content of the norms, as well as extensive state 
practice, indicates that they should not be charged with murder 
for lawful battlefield killings—actions for which they are legal-
ly immune under humanitarian law.140 In such cases, effective 
control should not lead States to enforce human rights trial 
norms, for doing so would effectively strip prisoners of war of 
their immunity.141 In this case, humanitarian law is clearly the 
lex specialis despite the State’s effective control.142 As noted 
above, effective control may be more relevant to situations 
where humanitarian law grants states permission and less rel-
evant where humanitarian law imposes obligations on states, 
in part because the special obligations may be born of condi-
tions other than military necessity.143 
This distinction has two important implications. First, it 
means that actors applying the specificity model must often 
consider additional factors beyond effective control to resolve 
the normative conflict between the two bodies of law. Second, it 
means that an actor need not accept that the extraterritorial 
application of human rights law turns on effective control in 
order to accept the relevance of effective control for resolving 
conflicts between the two bodies of law. A decision-maker may 
use an entirely different rule to determine whether human 
rights law applies but still look to effective control to determine 
whether applicable human rights law prevails. 
 
 138. See, e.g., Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶193 (1997) (suggesting that 
human rights law should apply after the arrest of attackers, due in part to the 
state’s level of control); see also supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Abella case). 
 139. See Droege, supra note 31, at 332 (discussing how the threshold de-
terminations for “effective control” differ between the application of humani-
tarian law versus human rights law). 
 140. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (delineating the law to be applied to 
POWs with specificity so as to render it the lex specialis). 
 143. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
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4. Expressions of Intent  
The fourth consideration—expressions of intent—derives 
from Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, which provides that treaties should be interpreted in light 
of their purpose, as expressed variously through agreements of 
the parties and instruments drawn up by individual parties in 
preparation for ratification.144 
In the Inter-American Commission’s decision in Avilán v. 
Colombia, for example, the Commission cited a previous ex-
pression of intent by the Government of Colombia to support a 
decision not to apply a law of war framework to extra-judicial 
killing, but rather to apply human rights law norms.145 The 
Commission explained: 
[T]here are additional elements that lead the Commission to consider 
that the victims were defenseless when assassinated by members of 
the police. For example, the judgment of the Administrative Tribunal 
of Cundinamarca, of June 3, 1993, held that the State was responsible 
for the death of four of the individuals and ordered that compensation 
be paid, rejecting the argument of legitimate action in combat . . . .146 
Hence, the Colombian State had previously indicated its intent 
to consider the relevant conduct outside the law of war frame-
work, and the Inter-American Commission used this expression 
of intent to come to its own decision.147 
5. State Practice 
State practice under the various instruments of humani-
tarian law and human rights law helps to reveal their proper 
scope and relationship to one another. As Article 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties explains: treaty in-
terpretation should be guided by “[a]ny subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation.”148 Hence, state prac-
 
 144. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 145. Avila v. Colombia, Case 11.142, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
26/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 165 (1997) (“The State argued that it 
did not dispute that members of the police killed the victims named in this 
case. Nonetheless, the State considered that these deaths did not involve vio-
lations of the victims’ rights because they occurred as the result of the legiti-
mate use of force by State agents.”). 
 146. Id. ¶ 136. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 144, art. 
31(3)(b). 
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tice informs treaty interpretation and helps to shape a custom-
ary law of lex specialis.149  
For example, human rights law requires States (with nar-
row exceptions not relevant here) to bring any person deprived 
of their liberty to trial for a valid criminal offense within a rea-
sonable period,150 while humanitarian law permits States to in-
tern enemy combatants as prisoners of war for the duration of 
hostilities and prohibits States from subjecting them to trial 
except for war crimes or for crimes committed during their in-
ternment.151 In resolving this conflict under the specificity rule, 
the “effective control” factor would suggest that, since prisoners 
of war are under the detaining State’s control, human rights 
law should govern.152 However, there is a wealth of state prac-
tice indicating that humanitarian law, not human rights law, 
properly governs the detention of enemy combatants without 
trial during international armed conflicts.153 Indeed, the provi-
sions of the Third Geneva Convention on the detention of pris-
oners of war during international armed conflict are generally 
recognized as customary international law.154 Thus state prac-
tice—together with the nature of the norms in conflict (a hu-
manitarian law obligation and a human rights law obliga-
tion)—suggest that humanitarian law is the lex specialis, even 
though the State exercises “effective control” over the enemy 
combatant. 
Having laid out the specificity test, we turn next to exam-
ining the stakes of this decision rule by looking at when the two 
bodies of law are truly in conflict—and therefore where the 
mechanism for choosing between the two comes into play. 
 
 149. See Droege, supra note 31, at 542–46 (more on the expressive influ-
ence of court jurisprudence). 
 150. See discussion infra Part IV.B (right to trial); see also ICCPR, supra 
note 25, art. 9 (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be 
brought promptly before a judge . . . .”).  
 151. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 4 (regarding the treatment of POWs 
during armed conflicts). 
 152. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 153. See, e.g., Hathaway, et al., supra note 27, at 400–04 (discussing exam-
ples of how the European Court of Human Rights has applied its analysis to 
this type of conflict of laws). 
 154. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 344–45 (discussing the Third Geneva 
Convention and its application in international law). 
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IV.  THE STAKES: WHEN THE TWO BODIES OF LAW 
CONFLICT   
Here we explore the stakes of the choice between human 
rights law and humanitarian law by examining several areas in 
which human rights law and humanitarian law have conflict-
ing legal rules. While the areas of law examined here—the 
right to life, detention and the right to trial, women’s rights, 
and the rights of free expression, association, and movement—
include the most significant areas of conflict between the two 
bodies of law, this discussion is intended to be illustrative ra-
ther than exhaustive. For each area of law, we lay out the rele-
vant human rights law, the relevant humanitarian law, and 
the ways in which each of the models outlined in Part II of this 
Article would resolve conflict between them. For purposes of 
this discussion, we focus on the human rights obligations im-
posed by customary international law, the ICCPR, and 
CEDAW.155 
 
 155. We recognize that the U.S. representatives have taken the position 
that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially. See Letter of Kevin Moley, 
supra note 26 (stating that it is not the position of the United States that the 
ICCPR applies extraterritorially); see also Michael J. Dennis, Application of 
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Mili-
tary Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 125 (2005) (“States have also ex-
pressed disagreement with the Committee’s view that the Covenant applies to 
acts of a state’s armed forces performed outside that state’s territory.”). That 
view, however, is not accepted by the Human Rights Committee and is gener-
ally regarded as an outlier position. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Com-
ments of the Human Rights Committee on the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, ¶ 284, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50 (Oct. 3, 1995) (“The 
Committee does not share the view expressed by the Government that the 
Covenant lacks extraterritorial reach under all circumstances.”). Moreover, 
the ICCPR includes several norms that create potential conflicts with humani-
tarian law norms. See, e.g., Letter of Kevin Moley, supra note 26 (arguing that 
the ICCPR leads to an absurd result in that “during an ongoing armed conflict, 
unlawful combatants receive more procedural rights than would lawful com-
batants under the Geneva Conventions”). In addition, we address CEDAW de-
spite the fact that the United States has not ratified the Convention. See Div. 
for the Advancement of Women, Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: State Parties, 
U.N. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm ( last visited Feb. 
28, 2012) (showing the countries who have ratified CEDAW). We do so be-
cause, (1) Afghanistan has ratified CEDAW, and it therefore arguably applies 
to U.S. activities in Afghanistan conducted with the Afghan government’s con-
sent; (2) some of the norms embodied in CEDAW are considered by some to be 
binding as customary international law; and (3) CEDAW remains before the 
Senate. See id; see also LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40750, 
THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINA-
TION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 4 
(2011) (discussing how CEDAW remains before the U.S. Senate); Bharathi 
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As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that, with 
the exception of the obligations to protect the right to life under 
the ICCPR and women’s rights under CEDAW, all of the hu-
man rights obligations discussed in this Part are derogable.156 
Derogation allows States to temporarily abrogate an obligation 
under exceptional emergency circumstances.157 Thus, where 
permitted and accepted by courts, derogation can resolve con-
flicts between the two bodies of law.158 In order to derogate, 
however, a State must notify other parties to the relevant hu-
man rights instrument and must explain which provisions it is 
derogating and its reasons for doing so.159 This public proce-
dure significantly raises the political costs of derogation.160 In-
deed, it implicitly acknowledges that the actions taken might 
violate human rights law in the absence of the derogation.161 
For this reason, States rarely formally derogate from their hu-
man rights obligations.162 The remainder of this Part will as-
sume that the State to which the law applies has not formally 
derogated from its relevant human rights obligations. However, 
unless the discussion notes that an obligation is nonderogable, 
 
Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the Sha-
ri’a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1953 (1995) 
(“[T]he Women’s Convention serves as an international treaty for those coun-
tries that have ratified it.”). 
 156. See discussion infra Part IV.B (right to trial), and Part IV.D (rights to 
freedom of expression, association, and movement). 
 157. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 4 (“In time of public emergency 
which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international 
law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See, e.g., id. (“Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself 
of the right of derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to 
the present Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the 
reasons by which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, 
through the same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such  
derogation.”). 
 160. Cf. Dennis, supra note 155, at 135–36 (discussing state practice in 
derogating from ICCPR obligations). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. (“[N]ot one state has submitted a notice of derogation suspend-
ing the extraterritorial application of the Covenant during periods of armed 
conflict or military occupation.”). 
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derogation remains an option for resolving the conflicts dis-
cussed here. 
A. THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
One of the clearest areas of conflict between the two bodies 
of law involves the right to life. Humanitarian law permits 
state agents to intentionally kill combatants and incidentally 
kill civilians (within clearly proscribed limits) in circumstances 
that human rights law does not countenance.163 Some of the 
conflicts between these legal frameworks can be resolved by 
reading ambiguous terms in human rights instruments to in-
corporate standards from humanitarian law during armed con-
flict,164 but at bottom the two bodies of law give fundamentally 
different answers to the question of when state agents can use 
lethal force. 
The ICCPR provides: “Every human being has the inherent 
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”165 The obligation is non-
derogable.166 The use of the word “arbitrarily” in this provision 
clearly implies that lethal force is permitted under some cir-
cumstances, but the text of the ICCPR itself provides little 
guidance on what those circumstances are.167 An Expert Meet-
ing on the Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of 
Occupation168 described the basic human rights law framework 
 
 163. See discussion supra Part III.B.2. 
 164. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the specificity model of 
conflict of laws). 
 165. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 6. 
 166. Id. art. 4 (stating that the provisions of Article 6 are nonderogable). 
 167. See generally id. ( lacking clear guidance as to what situations allow 
the use of lethal force in international conflicts). 
 168. The Expert Meeting was organized by the University Centre for In-
ternational Humanitarian Law, Geneva, and included a dozen prominent legal 
practitioners and academics. The participants were: 
 William Abresch, Director, Extra-Judicial Executions Program, Center 
for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of 
Law;  
 Yuri Boychenko, Head of Division for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation, Geneva;  
 Knut Dörmann, Deputy Head of the Legal Division, ICRC, Geneva;  
 Professor Louise Doswald-Beck, Director, University Centre for Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
Geneva;  
 Frederico Andreu Guzman, Senior Legal Advisor, International Com-
mission of Jurists, Geneva;  
 Professor Françoise J. Hampson, University of Essex, Member of the 
 2012] LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 1927 
 
for the use of lethal force as “the law enforcement model,” 
which has “two main features”: 
First, the use of potentially lethal force is restricted to a narrow range 
of circumstances. Likewise, the use of potentially lethal force must be 
proportionate; it must be limited to addressing the threat which is 
posed. The other main feature of the law enforcement model is that, 
where possible, State officials must arrest rather than kill persons 
who are posing a threat. Likewise, States must plan their operations 
so as to maximize the chances of being able to effect an arrest.169 
In other words, under human rights law, the use of lethal force is 
only permitted in situations in which it is necessary to address a 
specific threat that cannot be neutralized through arrest. 
Humanitarian law, on the other hand, allows far wider use 
of lethal force. As codified in the Geneva Conventions and in 
customary international law, humanitarian law permits state 
agents to target and kill enemy combatants who have not laid 
down their arms or been placed hors de combat. Humanitarian 
law also permits States to target civilians who are directly par-
ticipating in hostilities for the duration of their participation in 
hostilities.170 Enemy combatants do not have to pose a specific 
threat at the time they are targeted, nor do state agents have 
to attempt to arrest them before killing them. Moreover, hu-
manitarian law permits state agents to kill noncombatant civil-
ians in the course of attacking enemy combatants as long as the 
attack is aimed at a concrete and direct military objective and 
the resulting harm to civilians is necessary and proportionate 
to that objective.171 In other words, humanitarian law allows 
the use of lethal force subject to the principles of: (1) distinction 
 
U.N. Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Governor of the British Insti-
tute of Human Rights;  
 Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Europa Universität Viandrina, 
Frankfurt (Oder);  
 Professor David Kretzmer, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;  
 Colonel Philip McEvoy, Legal Advisor, Army Legal Services, United 
Kingdom;  
 Jelena Pejic, Legal Advisor, ICRC Legal Division, Geneva;  
 Steven Solomon, Principal Legal Officer, World Health Organization, 
Geneva, former Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Mission, Geneva; and 
 Wilder Tayler, Legal Director, Human Rights Watch.  
EXPERT MEETING ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICT AND SITUATIONS 
OF OCCUPATION, UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW, GENEVA, SWITZ. 43 (2005), available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/docs/ 
expert-meetings/2005/3rapport_droit_vie.pdf.  
 169. Id. at 8. 
 170. See AP I, supra note 21, art. 51(3). 
 171. See id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57. 
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(the parties to the conflict must distinguish between civilians 
and civilian objects and military objectives); (2) military neces-
sity (attacks must aim to achieve a concrete and direct military 
advantage); and (3) proportionality (incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects must be 
proportional to the concrete and direct military advantage  
anticipated).172 
The core tensions between the two bodies of law around the 
right to life thus concern the type of threat a person must pose 
before he or she can be targeted, whether the State has a duty 
to attempt to arrest a person before resorting to lethal force, 
and the degree to which the attack can incidentally harm non-
combatant civilians. The three models described in Part II of 
this Article—displacement, complementarity, and conflict reso-
lution—provide different approaches to resolving these tensions. 
The Displacement Model asks simply whether the relevant 
conduct is part of an armed conflict or not. If it is armed con-
flict, then humanitarian law applies, and if not, then the hu-
man rights “law enforcement model” applies. The ICJ’s Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion can be read to follow this approach, 
as it explains that “whether a particular loss of life, through 
the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an 
arbitrary deprivation of life . . . can only be decided by reference 
to the law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from 
the terms of the [ICCPR] itself.”173  
The Complementarity Model, on the other hand, would de-
ny that there is any irresolvable conflict between the two bodies 
of law. The ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion can alter-
natively be read to follow this approach, as it asserts that the 
ICCPR applies during armed conflict, but that during armed 
conflict “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life 
[under the ICCPR] . . . falls to be determined by the applicable 
lex specialis,” namely, humanitarian law.174 Under this ap-
proach, as one commentator put it, “humanitarian law is to be 
 
 172. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 21, at 3–36, 46–50; W. 
Michael Reisman & Douglas L. Stevick, The Applicability of International Law 
Standards to United Nations Economic Sanctions Programmes, 9 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 86, 94–95 (1998).  
 173. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,  
¶ 25 (July 8) (Advisory Opinion). As explained in Parts III.A & III.C, we be-
lieve that the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion is probably character-
ized as adopting a pure displacement or event-specific displacement approach. 
See supra notes 32–35, 64–70 and accompanying text. 
 174. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 25. 
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used to interpret a human rights rule, and, conversely in the 
context of the conduct of hostilities, human rights law may not 
be interpreted differently from humanitarian law.”175 Thus, be-
cause the right to life is articulated in the ICCPR using an am-
biguous term—“arbitrarily”—the displacement and comple-
mentarity models can reach the same answer.176 But they reach 
that answer in different ways: the Displacement Model applies 
humanitarian law directly, whereas the Complementarity Mod-
el applies it indirectly by interpreting the ICCPR term “arbitrar-
ily” to be defined by humanitarian law during armed conflict. 
The Conflict Resolution Model would approach the problem 
differently, giving effect to both legal frameworks whenever 
possible and choosing one to the exclusion of the other in cases 
of conflict. The Israeli Supreme Court, for example, in its opin-
ion in the Targeted Killings Case employed an approach akin to 
the event-specific displacement version of the Conflict Resolu-
tion Model, applying humanitarian law in all cases of conflict. 
When considering whether a State must attempt to arrest a ci-
vilian who is directly participating in hostilities before using 
lethal force against him, the High Court found a gap in the ap-
plicable humanitarian law and filled in that gap by requiring 
the State to abide by the human rights law duty to attempt ar-
rest.177 However, in cases where arrest is impracticable, the 
High Court found that humanitarian law applied, permitting 
the State to engage in targeted killing of civilians directly par-
ticipating in hostilities as long as the attacks do not dispropor-
tionately harm other civilians.178  
The Inter-American Commission has followed an approach 
that tracks the specificity version of the Conflict Resolution 
Model—our favored approach. In Abella, the Inter-American 
Commission applied humanitarian law to Argentina’s killing of 
 
 175. Ray Murphy, United Nations Military Operations and International 
Humanitarian Law: What Rules Apply to Peacekeepers?, 14 CRIM. L.F. 153, 
158 (2003). 
 176. See Dannenbaum Memo, supra note 30, at 7 (explaining that in the 
context of the right to life, the displacement and complementarity models can 
converge). 
 177. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Israel 
[2006] (2) PD 459, ¶ 40 (Isr.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/ 
WebALL?openview (follow “Israel” hyperlink; then follow “National Case Law” 
hyperlink; then follow “The Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. 
v. The Government of Israel et al., Supreme Court of Israel, 14 December 
2006” hyperlink). 
 178. Id. 
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participants in an armed attack on an army barracks,179 but it 
applied human rights law to Colombia’s killing of members of 
“marginal groups” engaged in mere “criminal activities.”180 The 
Commission’s analysis in Abella covers nearly all of the five 
factors we propose for the specificity rule of Conflict Resolution. 
Regarding the wording and content of the norms, the Commis-
sion observed that applicable human rights instruments were 
not “designed to regulate such situations and, thus, they con-
tain no rules governing the means and methods of warfare.”181 
In contrast, applicable rules of “humanitarian law generally af-
ford victims of armed conflicts greater or more specific protec-
tions than do the more generally phrased guarantees in the 
American Convention and other human rights instruments.”182 
Nevertheless, the Commission went on to emphasize the im-
portance of human rights law in the context of “internal armed 
conflict,”183 suggesting that standards change when govern-
ments exercise greater effective control. Also relevant to the 
analysis was which body of law created a “higher standard” for 
the applicable right or freedom.184 Although not identical to the 
permission/obligation approach we recommend, this inquiry 
demonstrates similar policy considerations. Finally, with re-
spect to factors four and five, the Commission considered com-
mentaries, international legal precedent, and the practice of 
OAS member states.185 This more nuanced approach to the 
right to life ensures that human rights norms are applied with-
out losing their substantive force, but at the same time appro-
priately tailors the legal rules to the armed conflict context in 
which they are applied. 
B. DETENTION AND THE RIGHT TO TRIAL 
A second important area of conflict between human rights 
law and humanitarian law concerns detention and the right to 
trial. There are several interlocking conflicts between these two 
bodies of law in this area. Most importantly, humanitarian law 
permits States to intern POWs for the duration of hostilities 
 
 179. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 156 (1997). 
 180. Colombia Report, supra note 109, ¶¶ 208, 213. 
 181. Abella, ¶ 158. 
 182. Id. ¶ 159 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. ¶ 160. 
 184. Id. ¶¶ 164–65. 
 185. See id. ¶¶ 160, 162, 166. 
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and prohibits States from trying them for lawful combat activi-
ties,186 while human rights law requires all individuals de-
prived of their liberty to be brought to trial,187 with only limited 
exceptions. Humanitarian law also permits States to intern 
certain civilians without trial for security reasons,188 which 
human rights law would prohibit. In addition, humanitarian 
law allows certain detention-related disputes to be adjudicated 
by administrative tribunals,189 while human rights law re-
quires a judicial hearing.190 Finally, human rights law guaran-
tees defendants the right to court-appointed counsel,191 while 
humanitarian law does not.192 
Turning first to human rights law, human rights instru-
ments provide all individuals detained by the State with robust 
rights to judicial review. Article 9 of the ICCPR provides that 
“[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention 
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order 
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of 
his detention and order his release if the detention is not law-
ful.”193 In general, the “proceedings before a court” must take 
the form of a criminal trial, although detention without trial is 
permissible for narrow reasons pending trial, for reasons relat-
ed to the detainee’s physical or mental health, and for reasons 
related to controlling immigration.194 Where the proceedings 
take the form of a criminal trial, accused individuals have the 
right to a public hearing before an impartial tribunal, the right 
to be informed of charges against them,195 the right to defend 
 
 186. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 21; Henckhaerts & Doswald-Beck, su-
pra note 21, at 384. 
 187. AP I, supra note 21, art. 75(4). 
 188. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, art. 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [herein-
after GC IV]. 
 189. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 96. 
 190. Henckhaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 21, at 355. 
 191. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9. 
 192. See GC III, supra note 13, art. 72 (stating that the “Protecting Power 
may provide” defendants court-appointed counsel, suggesting that there is dis-
cretion within the Protecting Power). 
 193. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9. 
 194. See Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and 
Human Rights, ¶¶ 118, 124, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr (Oct. 22, 
2002) (interpreting nearly identical provisions of the American Declaration on 
Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights and noting the 
similarity to the provisions of the ICCPR). 
 195. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 14(3)(a). 
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themselves,196 the right to an interpreter,197 the right to cross-
examine witnesses,198 the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty,199 and the right to appeal.200 When hearings 
cannot be public for reasons of public order, morals, or national 
security, judgments must be made public, with some narrow 
exceptions.201 Accused individuals also have the right “[t]o have 
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [their] de-
fence and to communicate with counsel of [their] own choos-
ing,”202 and they must be appointed a defender if they cannot 
afford one.203 They also must be “tried without undue delay.”204 
Detention under human rights law is thus focused on criminal 
law enforcement, with limited exceptions for public safety and 
immigration. 
States’ authority to detain under humanitarian law is gen-
erally broader than under human rights law, although the 
scope of that authority depends on whether the detainee is a 
POW or a civilian. When members of the enemy’s armed forces 
are captured, humanitarian law permits the State to intern205 
them as POWs without trial for the duration of hostilities.206 
However, POWs need only give their name, rank, serial num-
ber, and date of birth in response to any questioning,207 and 
 
 196. Id. art. 14(3)(d). 
 197. Id. art. 14(3)(f ). 
 198. Id. art. 14(3)(e). 
 199. Id. art. 14(2). 
 200. Id. art. 14(5). 
 201. Id. art. 14(1). 
 202. Id. art. 14(3)(b). 
 203. Id. art. 14(3)(d). 
 204. Id. art. 14(3)(c). 
 205. Internment is a form of deprivation of liberty distinct from and less 
harsh than detention. The ICRC’s commentary to the Third Geneva Conven-
tion explains that 
[t]o intern a person is to put him in a certain area or place—in the 
case of prisoners of war, usually a camp—and to forbid him to leave 
its limits. The concept of internment should not be confused with that 
of detention. Internment involves the obligation not to leave the town, 
village, or piece of land, whether or not fenced in, on which the camp 
installations are situated, but it does not necessarily mean that a 
prisoner of war may be confined to a cell or a room. Such confinement 
may only be imposed in execution of penal or disciplinary sanc-
tions . . . . 
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE 
TREATMENT OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR 178 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960). 
 206. GC III, supra note 13, art. 21. 
 207. Id. art. 17. 
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they must be released at the end of hostilities.208 POWs also en-
joy immunity for lawful combat activities, and therefore may 
not be tried for murder or similar civil crimes.209 POWs may be 
punitively detained during or after hostilities only upon convic-
tion for a war crime or for a crime committed during intern-
ment, and States must provide accused POWs with the basic 
guarantees of due process.210 Where an individual’s combatant 
status is unclear, a competent tribunal (not necessarily a court) 
must determine whether the individual qualifies as a POW.211 
Civilians, on the other hand, have rights against detention un-
der humanitarian law that are simultaneously narrower and 
broader than those of POWs. States may intern aliens within 
their territory and civilians residing in occupied territory only 
where “security . . . makes it absolutely necessary”212 or for 
“imperative reasons of security.”213 However, unlike POWs, in-
terned civilians are entitled to have the substantive basis for 
their internment reviewed by a competent tribunal (again, not 
necessarily a civilian court).214 For civilians residing in occu-
pied territory, the penal code of the occupied State presump-
tively remains in place, but the occupying State may supple-
ment that code with its own penal laws on a prospective 
basis.215 Unlike lawful combatants, civilians enjoy no immunity 
from ordinary penal laws, and therefore may be tried and in-
carcerated for murder or other crimes to the extent that they 
participate in hostilities, subject to basic procedural guaran-
tees. Those procedural guarantees, however, do not include the 
right to appointed counsel,216 and the tribunal hearing the case 
may be a military rather than a civilian court.217 
The central conflicts between the two bodies of law sur-
rounding detention thus concern States’ ability to intern POWs 
and civilians without trial, the extent to which detention or in-
ternment must be subject to review by a court, and whether ci-
 
 208. Id. art. 133. 
 209. See id. art. 70. 
 210. AP I, supra note 21, art. 75(4)(d); AP II, supra note 21, art. 6(2); GC 
III, supra note 13, arts. 95–96, 99, 103–07. 
 211. GC III, supra note 13, art. 5. 
 212. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 42. 
 213. Id. art. 78. 
 214. Id. arts. 43, 78. 
 215. Id. arts. 64–67. 
 216. See id. arts. 71–74. 
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vilians in an occupied territory are entitled to appointed coun-
sel if tried for a crime.  
The Displacement Model would resolve these conflicts by 
asking simply whether or not there is an armed conflict. If an 
armed conflict is present, then POWs and civilians may be in-
terned without trial, POWs may not be tried for their lawful 
combat activities, disputes around combatant status and the 
basis for civilian internment may be adjudicated by adminis-
trative or military tribunals, and civilians in occupied territory 
need not be provided with appointed counsel. If no armed con-
flict is present, then all detainees must be brought to trial be-
fore a court (subject to the exceptions for public safety and im-
migration), there is no immunity for combat activities, and 
criminal defendants must be afforded appointed counsel. 
The Complementarity Model would proceed by attempting 
to reconcile the requirements of the two bodies of law. With re-
gard to appointed counsel, since humanitarian law does not ex-
pressly provide that occupying States have no obligation to 
provide appointed counsel, this model would be expected to re-
solve that conflict by requiring the appointment of counsel. 
Similarly, no provision of humanitarian law would be violated 
by having combatant status disputes and civilian internee cas-
es heard by a judicial instead of an administrative tribunal, as 
human rights law would require.218 The Complementarity 
Model, however, cannot effectively address the truly irreconcil-
able conflict over whether or not States must bring all detained 
individuals to trial. Humanitarian law provides that POWs 
 
 218. The Inter-American Commission suggested its support for this ap-
proach in the executive summary to its Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights: 
Notwithstanding the existence of these specific rules and mechanisms 
governing the detention of persons in situations of armed conflict, 
there may be circumstances in which the supervising mechanisms 
under international humanitarian law are not properly engaged or 
available, or where the detention or internment of civilians or com-
batants continue [sic] for a prolonged period. Where this occurs, the 
regulations and procedures under international humanitarian law 
may prove inadequate to properly safeguard the minimum standards 
of treatment of detainees, and the supervisory mechanisms under in-
ternational human rights law, including habeas corpus and amparo 
remedies, may necessarily supercede international humanitarian law 
in order to ensure at all times effective protection of the fundamental 
rights of detainees.  
Report on Terrorism and Human Rights Executive Summary, supra note 194, 
¶ 14. 
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cannot be brought to trial,219 but human rights law provides 
that they must;220 humanitarian law provides that civilians 
may be interned for security reasons,221 but human rights law 
provides that they may not.222 These rules cannot be easily 
harmonized. 
The Conflict Resolution Model would take the same ap-
proach as the Complementarity Model in cases where human 
rights law and humanitarian law are in a relationship of inter-
pretation, and would then resolve cases of true conflict accord-
ing to the chosen rule of conflict resolution. Accordingly, the 
Conflict Resolution Model would, like the Complementarity 
Model, provide appointed counsel and would adjudicate all dis-
putes over the basis for detention before judicial rather than 
administrative tribunals. As for internment of POWs and civil-
ians without trial, the event-specific displacement version of 
the Conflict Resolution Model would apply humanitarian law 
and allow internment without trial. The reverse event-specific 
displacement model—which some tribunals have followed for 
jurisdictional reasons—would instead apply human rights law 
and demand that all detainees be brought to trial. Finally, the 
specificity version of the Conflict Resolution Model would al-
most certainly turn to humanitarian law as the more specific 
law governing captured enemy combatants, based on an as-
sessment of the wording and content of the norms, the nature 
of the norms in question, the level of control exercised by the 
State, expressions of intent by parties to relevant treaties, and 
state practice. After all, humanitarian law has numerous de-
tailed provisions on the internment of POWs that both expand 
and restrain state power relative to the peacetime baseline, and 
the history of state practice applying these rules is sufficiently 
robust to render them binding as customary international 
law.223 Detention thus provides the clearest demonstration of 
the importance of contextual assessment of human rights and 
humanitarian law, which only the specificity rule version of the 
Conflict Resolution Model permits.  
 
 219. ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 
21, at 384. 
 220. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9(3). 
 221. GC IV, supra note 188, art. 42. 
 222. See ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9. 
 223. See ICRC, supra note 21, at 344–52. 
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C. WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
A third potential area of conflict between the two bodies of 
law concerns women’s rights. The leading human rights con-
vention on women’s rights, the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), obli-
gates state parties (which do not presently include the United 
States) to “take all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrim-
ination and guarantee legal, social, and economic equality to 
women.224 Humanitarian law, however, focuses more narrowly 
on protecting women from sexual assault and protecting them 
in their role as mothers. While the protections under the two 
bodies of law are largely compatible, conflicts may arise during 
armed conflict due to an occupying State’s obligation under 
humanitarian law to preserve local law and States’ diminished 
capacity to guarantee the degree of social equality envisioned 
by human rights law in the context of war. 
Human rights law broadly provides for non-discrimination 
and equality for women in all fields of society. CEDAW requires 
States to “accord to women equality with men before the 
law,”225 and to “take all appropriate measures” to eliminate dis-
crimination and ensure equal rights to vote, to participate in 
government, to participate in public associations and organiza-
tions,226 to education,227 to healthcare,228 to employment and 
economic opportunity,229 and to the benefits and burdens of 
marriage.230 CEDAW does not explicitly prohibit violence 
against women, but States may have an obligation to prevent 
violence against women as a matter of customary human rights 
law.231 While CEDAW has no derogation provision, the rights 
therein are generally articulated at a relatively high level of 
abstraction—for example, Article 12 provides that “State Par-
ties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women in the field of health care in order to en-
sure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health 
 
 224. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 225. Id. art. 15.  
 226. Id. arts. 7–8. 
 227. Id. art. 10. 
 228. Id. art. 12. 
 229. Id. arts. 11, 13–14. 
 230. Id. art. 16. 
 231. See BONITA MEYERSFELD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 6 (2010). 
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care services.”232 Moreover, the language of “tak[ing] all appro-
priate measures” suggests that States have some leeway in ex-
actly how they implement their obligations.233 
Under humanitarian law, women enjoy the same protec-
tions that apply to all persons during armed conflict, but there 
are also a number of provisions that protect women exclusive-
ly.234 Under the Geneva Conventions, women must “be treated 
with all consideration due to their sex.”235 This entails a right 
against discrimination—under the Third Geneva Convention, 
for example, female prisoners of war must “in all cases benefit 
by treatment as favourable as that granted to men”236 and may 
not be sentenced to a more severe punishment than male mem-
bers of the detaining armed forces in similar circumstances.237 
Beyond non-discrimination, humanitarian law also has provi-
sions giving women special protection due to their reproductive 
roles and vulnerability to sexual assault.238 Numerous articles 
in the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I ex-
pressly single out mothers and pregnant women for special 
consideration and protection.239 The Fourth Geneva Convention 
and Additional Protocol I also provide that women must be pro-
tected from sexual violence, including rape, assault, and forced 
prostitution.240 Female POWs also are given special considera-
tion regarding privacy: they may not be housed with or 
searched by men.241 In addition, even beyond the Geneva Con-
ventions, the U.N. Security Council recently has adopted a se-
 
 232. CEDAW, supra note 224, art. 12. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See ICRC, ANNEX TO THE GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: GENERAL AND SPE-
CIFIC PROTECTION OF WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,ICRC,,, 
46e94378d,0.html (discussing provisions protecting women throughout various 
issues). 
 235. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and the Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 12(4), Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 
1949, art. 12(4), 75 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 236. GC III, supra note 13, art. 14. 
 237. Id. art. 88(3). 
 238. See Judith G. Gardam, Women, Human Rights and International Hu-
manitarian Law, 324 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 421, 421–22 (1998). 
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ries of resolutions aimed at protecting women from gender-
based violence during armed conflict and at providing women a 
role in conflict-resolution and peace-making.242 At the same 
time, however, the Fourth Geneva Convention establishes that 
occupying States have an obligation to preserve the penal law 
of the occupied State and to allow local tribunals to continue to 
operate.243 
The differences between the two bodies of law regarding 
women’s rights thus center around (1) the broader scope of pro-
tection that human rights law provides compared to humani-
tarian law, (2) occupying States’ obligation under humanitarian 
law to preserve local law and local courts even if they discrimi-
nate against women in contravention of human rights law, and 
(3) States’ diminished capacity to guarantee the kind of social 
equality envisioned by human rights law during armed conflict.  
The Displacement Model would resolve each of these con-
flicts in favor of humanitarian law in all cases during armed 
conflict. While in an armed conflict situation, the broader pro-
tections of human rights law would not apply, even when they 
are not incompatible with the narrower protections afforded by 
humanitarian law. Similarly, occupying States’ obligation to 
preserve local law and local courts would supersede any human 
rights law duty of nondiscrimination, and any diminished State 
capacity to guarantee equality would be moot, since there 
would be no human rights law obligation to take appropriate 
measures to ensure social equality. 
The Complementarity Model would attempt to harmonize a 
State’s obligations under the two bodies of law. Because the 
broader protections afforded by human rights law are not in-
compatible with humanitarian law’s narrower and more specif-
ic protections, this approach would apply both sets of obliga-
tions. As for occupying States’ duty to protect local law and 
local courts, the complementarity approach might proceed by 
noting that CEDAW only obligates States to “take all appropri-
ate measures” to guarantee equality;244 accordingly, measures 
that would violate the Geneva Conventions could be considered 
not to be “appropriate,” and therefore not mandatory under 
CEDAW. The complementarity approach might also exploit the 
 
 242. See S.C. Res. 1888, ¶¶ 3, 18, 26, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 
2009); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶¶ 3, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. 
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leeway implicit in the word “appropriate” in addressing States’ 
diminished capacity in wartime, concluding that CEDAW only 
requires States to eliminate discrimination against women to 
the extent that they have the effective capacity to do so.  
Such an approach, in which the two bodies of law are taken 
to be reconcilable, would align with developments in the two 
bodies of law over the past two decades. Humanitarian law has 
come to encompass more protections for women’s rights, and 
human rights law has begun to acknowledge the risk that 
women face from gender-based violence both in and out of con-
flict settings.245 The Vienna Declaration adopted by the U.N. 
World Conference on Human Rights recognized the fundamen-
tal convergence between these two bodies of law, declaring that 
“violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed 
conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of human 
rights and humanitarian law.”246 
The Conflict Resolution Model would reach the same ulti-
mate conclusions as the Complementarity Model in this area of 
law. After all, the Conflict Resolution Model only requires re-
sort to a rule of conflict resolution when there is a true conflict 
between the relevant human rights law and humanitarian law. 
In this case, human rights law and humanitarian law are in a 
relationship of interpretation, and thus it is possible to apply 
each without excluding the validity and applicability of the oth-
er. The overlap between the Complementarity and Conflict 
Resolution Models in the area of women’s rights illustrates 
that, to the extent that human rights law and humanitarian 
law norms do not conflict, the Conflict Resolution Model oper-
ates precisely the same as the Complementarily Model. 
 
 245. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimina-
tion of Violence Against Women in 1993 which “expressly recognized that 
women in situations of armed conflict are especially vulnerable to violence.” 
Gardam, supra note 238, at 426. The U.N. has also appointed a Special Rap-
porteur on violence against women “with a mandate covering situations of 
armed conflict . . . . The Fourth U.N. World Conference on Women, held in Bei-
jing in 1995, recognized the seriousness of armed conflict and its impact on the 
lives of women.” Id. at 427.  
 246. Id. at 426 (quoting World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 
(Part I) (Oct. 13, 1993)). 
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D. THE RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSOCIATION, AND 
MOVEMENT 
The rights to free expression, association, and movement 
provide a fourth area of potential conflict between human 
rights law and humanitarian law. While conflicts may arise, 
however, the human rights law and humanitarian law relating 
to these rights are largely reconcilable due to limitations on the 
scope of the rights under the ICCPR and due to the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention’s baseline concern for the fundamental rights 
of civilians residing in occupied territories. 
The rights to free expression, association, and movement 
are all protected in the ICCPR. Article 19 guarantees “the right 
to hold opinions without interference” and “the right to freedom 
of expression”;247 Article 21 guarantees “the right of peaceful 
assembly”;248 and Article 12 guarantees “the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose [one’s] residence.”249 These 
rights, however, are not absolute under the ICCPR. Each may 
be restricted in the interest of “national security, public order 
(ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and free-
doms of others.”250 
Humanitarian law has a number of provisions that touch 
on the rights to free expression, association, and movement. 
Turning first to free expression, humanitarian law’s definition 
of a “military objective”—“those objects which by their nature, 
location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to mili-
tary action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a 
definite military advantage”251—is clearly broad enough to en-
compass media and communications infrastructure, rendering 
important means of expression legitimate targets of military 
attack. In addition, the Fourth Geneva Convention permits an 
occupying State to supplement local law with its own penal 
laws to the extent that they are “essential to enable the Occu-
pying Power . . . to maintain the orderly government of the ter-
ritory[] and to ensure the security of the Occupying Pow-
er . . . .”252 This authority does not extend so far as to allow an 
 
 247. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 19(1)–(2). 
 248. Id. art. 21. 
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occupying State to punish “opinions expressed before the occu-
pation,”253 but that very limitation suggests that an occupying 
State may punish opinions expressed during the occupation. 
This same power to establish new laws also leaves room for an 
occupying State to restrict the right of free association and as-
sembly. As for the right to freedom of movement, the commen-
tary on Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly 
recognizes that “the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy 
nationality may certainly be restricted, or even temporarily 
suppressed, if circumstances so require.”254 That same com-
mentary notes, however, that “the regulations concerning occu-
pation and those concerning civilian aliens in the territory of a 
Party to the conflict are based on the idea of the personal free-
dom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired.”255 Thus, to 
varying degrees, humanitarian law explicitly or implicitly per-
mits States to restrict the rights of freedom of expression, asso-
ciation, and movement recognized by human rights law during 
armed conflict.  
The Displacement Model would resolve these conflicts by 
allowing States to restrict those rights to the full extent al-
lowed by humanitarian law, with human rights law completely 
displaced within the zone of armed conflict.  
The Complementarity Model would likely proceed by not-
ing that each of these rights is limited in human rights law it-
self by considerations of national security and public order, 
considerations that are unquestionably triggered during armed 
conflict. Similarly, the commentary to Article 27 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention demonstrates that while humanitarian law 
permits these rights to be restricted, it starts from the baseline 
proposition that they should be honored where possible.256 In 
this way, the two bodies of law can be interpreted so that their 
respective norms are compatible and mutually reinforcing.  
As with women’s rights, the Conflict Resolution Model 
would follow the same approach as the Complementarity Model 
in this area of law. The relevant norms are in a relationship of 
interpretation rather than a relationship of conflict, therefore 
the Conflict Resolution Model need not employ a rule of conflict 
resolution here. 
 
 253. Id. art. 70. 
 254. ICRC, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PRO-
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Together, these four examples demonstrate how the vari-
ous models outlined in Part II operate when human rights law 
and humanitarian law have different or conflicting norms. In 
each case, the Displacement Model offers a straightforward but 
unnuanced solution—one that always requires human rights 
law to defer to humanitarian law, even in cases where human 
rights law is better tailored to the situation or where human 
rights law might productively inform humanitarian law. The 
Complementarity Model, by contrast, gives full effect to both 
bodies of law. But it is incapable of addressing irreconcilable 
conflicts between the two bodies of law—particularly regarding 
the right to life and detention and right to trial—and thus of-
fers an incomplete solution. The Conflict Resolution Model—in 
particular the version that employs the specificity test to re-
solve conflicts—has the strengths of the Complementarity 
Model without its weaknesses. It gives full effect to both bodies 
of law, using both to inform one another wherever possible. But 
it offers a tool for resolving direct conflicts between the two 
bodies of law—guiding decision makers to turn to the body of 
law most specific to the particular event at hand, a determina-
tion informed by five key factors. 
  CONCLUSION   
In the period following the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the United States, United Kingdom, and other States commit-
ted increasing numbers of troops abroad in an effort to elimi-
nate the threat of terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and its affili-
ates. With that war now in its second decade, a host of new 
legal questions has emerged. Key among them is what law the-
se States should turn to in determining the legality of their 
conduct. Does human rights law impose obligations on the ac-
tions of States outside their own territory? If so, what happens 
when those obligations conflict with the legal rules as defined 
by humanitarian law? Must prisoners of war be tried (as re-
quired for detainees under human rights law) or may they only 
be held to the end of hostilities (as required under humanitari-
an law)? Is a State obligated to attempt to arrest a civilian di-
rectly participating in hostilities or may the State use lethal 
force against him without first attempting arrest? The answer 
to these questions depends on which body of law—human 
rights law or humanitarian law—applies.  
This Article has outlined three separate models for answer-
ing this question. Under the Displacement Model, humanitari-
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an law displaces human rights law entirely in the zone of 
armed conflict; under the Complementarity Model, the two bod-
ies of law both apply in armed conflict and are interpreted 
harmoniously; and under the Conflict Resolution Model, the 
two bodies of law may both apply in armed conflict but when 
that is not possible, there are three possible decision rules for 
choosing between the two bodies of law. Of the three possible 
rules, we argue for the specificity rule, in which the choice be-
tween applying human rights law or humanitarian law de-
pends on which is deemed most specific to the given situation. 
This approach allows for highly nuanced determinations as to 
whether particular conduct in the context of armed conflict may 
be governed best by human rights law or humanitarian law 
when the two conflict, while also recognizing—as the Comple-
mentarity Model does—that both bodies of law may productive-
ly inform each other in the many situations in which they do 
not conflict. The approach is also consistent with the jurispru-
dence of a range of international tribunals and the positions of 
U.S. allies.  
This approach recognizes that humanitarian law is often—
but not always—the body of law most specifically tailored to 
armed conflict situations. Merely because a given situation oc-
curs within an armed conflict zone does not necessarily pre-
clude the application of human rights law. Indeed, human 
rights law offers an alternative toolset that may be better tai-
lored to a given situation. At the same time, this approach does 
not pretend that all conflicts between the two bodies of law can 
be resolved through a process of interpretation. Some conflicts 
are irreconcilable, and it is necessary to have an effective tool 
for resolving those conflicts. 
Humanitarian law and human rights law regulate similar 
conduct and are both rooted in an effort to safeguard human 
dignity. Jakob Kellenberger, President of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross once wrote, “[l]ike international 
human rights, international humanitarian law aims, among 
other things, to protect human life, prevent and punish torture 
and ensure fundamental judicial guarantees to persons subject 
to criminal process.”257 The specificity-based Conflict Resolu-
tion Model, which gives maximum effect to both bodies of law 
where possible but offers a balanced approach for choosing be-
tween them when necessary, offers the most effective available 
 
 257. Kellenberger, supra note 42. 
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legal tool for protecting that fundamental human dignity.  
